Leonard L. Bursten v. United States
3 A.L.R. Fed. 644, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1403, 395 F.2d 976 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant is entitled to a specific jury instruction on a good-faith reliance on counsel defense if there is an evidentiary foundation for it. Additionally, a trial judge's repeated, prejudicial interventions that undermine defense counsel and express a belief in the defendant's guilt can deprive the defendant of their constitutional right to a fair trial.
Facts:
- In 1950, Bursten co-founded the Kadison Corporation, which later failed, leaving him with a small amount of deductible losses for future years.
- In 1951, Bursten borrowed $10,000 from his uncle, Walter Sawyer, using 16 shares of East Corporation stock as collateral. After Bursten defaulted, Sawyer had the stock transferred into his own name.
- In 1955, Bursten entered into the 'Boca Ciega Land Contract,' which entitled him to a fifty percent interest in a real estate development in exchange for legal services.
- On August 26, 1957, Bursten sold his interest in the Boca Ciega contract for $160,000.
- Later in 1957, Bursten's wife threatened to sue him over the East Corporation stock. To settle this, Bursten transferred to her a two-thirds interest in a separate property, which he valued at approximately $140,000.
- Bursten consulted his tax counsel, William J. Goldworn, regarding the preparation of his 1957 tax return.
- Bursten filed a 1957 tax return reporting the $160,000 gain but offsetting it with a purported $140,000 'carry-over loss' from the Kadison Corporation, resulting in no taxable income reported for the year.
- At trial, Bursten testified that the $140,000 loss actually represented the value of the property he transferred to his wife in the 1957 settlement, not a loss from the Kadison Corporation, and that he reported it this way based on Goldworn's advice.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government indicted Bursten for willful income tax evasion for the 1957 tax year in a U.S. District Court.
- Following a jury trial, Bursten was found guilty as charged.
- The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Bursten to eighteen months of imprisonment (with fifteen suspended) and a $5,000 fine.
- Bursten (appellant) then appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give a specific jury instruction on the defendant's theory of reliance on competent tax counsel's advice, and by repeatedly making prejudicial comments that undermine the defendant's right to a fair trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Dawkins, Jr., J.
Yes. The trial court committed reversible error on two grounds. First, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that has a foundation in the evidence. Here, Bursten presented evidence that he relied on the advice of his tax counsel, William Goldworn, which could negate the element of 'willfulness' required for a tax evasion conviction. The trial judge improperly refused to give a specific instruction on this defense because he personally believed the tax counsel was 'not a good tax man,' thereby usurping the jury's role in evaluating the evidence and weighing intent. Second, the trial judge's repeated and prejudicial interventions throughout the trial deprived Bursten of a fair trial. The judge's comments, which included expressing disbelief in the defense, belittling defense counsel, and interrogating witnesses in a partisan manner, created an atmosphere where a fair and impartial verdict was impossible.
Concurring - Simpson, J.
Yes, but only in part. I concur in the judgment to reverse and remand for a new trial based on the trial judge's prejudicial conduct, as detailed in Part III of the majority opinion. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion in Part II that the refusal to give the requested jury instruction was error. The proposed instruction was deficient because it failed to include the necessary elements that the defendant must make a full disclosure of all facts to his counsel and must actually rely on that counsel's advice. It was not the trial court's duty to correct the defective instruction, and therefore refusing to give it was not error.
Analysis:
This case strongly affirms two critical principles of criminal procedure and trial practice. It reinforces that the 'advice of counsel' defense is a potent tool against charges requiring specific intent, like willfulness, and mandates that if any evidentiary basis exists for the defense, the jury must be specifically instructed on it. More broadly, the case serves as a powerful admonition to trial judges to maintain neutrality. By cataloging extensive judicial misconduct, the court establishes a clear precedent that a judge's partisan commentary and excessive intervention can, by themselves, constitute reversible error by violating a defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, regardless of the strength of the evidence against them.
