Leocal v. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.

Supreme Court of United States
543 U.S. 1 (2004)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An offense that can be committed with a mental state of mere negligence or less, such as a typical state DUI offense causing injury, does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16. The statutory phrase "use... of physical force against the person or property of another" implies a higher degree of intent than merely accidental or negligent conduct.

Facts:

Josué Leocal was a Haitian citizen and a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
In January 2000, Leocal operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
While driving, he caused an accident that resulted in serious bodily injury to two people.
Leocal pleaded guilty to two counts of DUI causing serious bodily injury under a Florida statute.
The Florida statute under which Leocal was convicted does not require proof of any particular mental state (mens rea) regarding the causation of injury.

Procedural Posture:

Josué Leocal was convicted in Florida state court and sentenced to 2.5 years in prison.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against Leocal, arguing his conviction was an 'aggravated felony.'
An Immigration Judge found Leocal removable.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the Immigration Judge's order.
Leocal, the petitioner, filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition for review, finding the DUI conviction was a crime of violence.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Leocal's petition for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does a state conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and causing serious bodily injury, where the underlying statute does not require a culpable mental state, constitute a 'crime of violence' under 18 U.S.C. § 16, thus qualifying as an 'aggravated felony' for deportation purposes under the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Opinions:

Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist

No. A conviction under a state DUI statute that lacks a mens rea element does not qualify as a 'crime of violence' under 18 U.S.C. § 16. The court reasoned that § 16(a)'s requirement of the 'use... of physical force against the person or property of another' implies active and intentional employment of force, not the accidental or negligent conduct that can underlie a DUI conviction. The ordinary meaning of 'use force against' does not encompass accidental contact, such as an injury resulting from a car crash. Similarly, § 16(b), which covers offenses involving a 'substantial risk' that force 'may be used,' refers to the risk of using force to commit the offense (e.g., burglary), not the risk of an accidental injury resulting from the offense. Finally, the Court noted that another immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h), separately lists 'crime of violence' and DUI-causing-injury offenses, indicating Congress did not consider them to be the same category.

Analysis:

This decision significantly narrows the scope of what constitutes a 'crime of violence' for the purpose of defining an 'aggravated felony' in immigration law. By requiring a mens rea greater than mere negligence for the application of force, the Court prevents the automatic classification of many state-level offenses, like DUI causing injury, as deportable offenses. The ruling established a crucial distinction between crimes involving intentional, active violence and offenses where harm is an accidental or negligent byproduct, impacting how federal courts and agencies analyze state criminal statutes in immigration and other federal contexts.

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