Lent v. Huntoon
470 A.2d 1162, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2547, 143 Vt. 539 (1983)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In Vermont, libel is actionable per se, meaning special damages need not be proven, but a plaintiff must still demonstrate some actual harm to recover general damages. Punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing of actual malice, such as knowingly publishing false statements or acting with reckless disregard for their truth.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Lent worked for Huntoon Business Machines, Inc. for thirteen years, eventually becoming the service manager.
- Upon being hired in 1964, Lent informed the owner, H. J. Huntoon, of a past criminal conviction and a minor military offense.
- In early 1977, Lent notified Huntoon of his intention to resign and move to Florida, offering to stay and train his replacement.
- Shortly thereafter, Huntoon terminated Lent's employment without prior notice.
- When Lent's plan to move fell through, he remained in the area and started his own competing business, Lent Business Machines.
- Lent's new company was awarded a sales and service franchise previously held by Huntoon Corporation, making them direct competitors.
- Huntoon Corporation sent a letter to its former customers stating that Lent had been discharged for 'sound business reasons.'
- H. J. Huntoon also orally told customers that Lent had a long criminal record, had stolen money and merchandise from the company, and was an incompetent serviceman.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Lent filed a complaint for libel and slander against H. J. Huntoon and Huntoon Business Machines, Inc. in the Rutland Superior Court (trial court).
- Defendants' motions for a directed verdict on special and punitive damages, made at the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the close of all evidence, were denied by the trial court.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $15,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.
- The trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
- Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative for a new trial or remittitur, which the trial court denied.
- Defendants (appellants) appealed the final judgment and the denial of their post-trial motions to the Supreme Court of Vermont, with Lent as the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does evidence that a defendant knew his defamatory statements were false and repeated them in competitive business situations constitute sufficient proof of malice to support a jury's award of punitive damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Underwood, J.
Yes. A defendant's knowledge that their defamatory statements are false, coupled with repetition of those statements, provides ample evidence of actual malice to support an award of punitive damages. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendants acted with actual malice. Specifically, the jury had evidence that the defendants knew Lent had voluntarily quit and was not fired for 'sound business reasons,' knew the allegations of theft were false, knew Lent did not have a 'record a mile long,' and repeated these slanderous statements. This conduct demonstrates a reckless disregard for the truth and is sufficient to sustain the jury's award of punitive damages.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and modernizes Vermont's defamation law. The court formally rejects the confusing 'libel per quod' doctrine, holding that all libel, whether defamatory on its face or through extrinsic evidence, is actionable per se. Crucially, it aligns Vermont with the constitutional standard from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., by requiring plaintiffs to show 'actual harm' to recover general damages, even in per se cases, thereby overruling prior precedent. This decision provides a clear framework for future defamation claims, balancing protection of reputation with First Amendment principles.
