Lemmon v. . People.
20 N.Y. 562 (1860)
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Rule of Law:
A state possesses the sovereign authority to determine the legal status of all individuals within its jurisdiction, and may therefore declare free any enslaved person voluntarily brought within its borders, even if the owner is merely in transit between two slaveholding states. Such a state law does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Facts:
- Juliet Lemmon, a resident of Virginia, was the owner of eight enslaved persons.
- She intended to permanently move these individuals from her home in Norfolk, Virginia, to the State of Texas.
- Both Virginia and Texas were states where slavery was legally permitted.
- To facilitate the journey, Lemmon traveled with the enslaved persons by steamship from Norfolk to New York City.
- The stop in New York was for the sole purpose of securing passage on another vessel to continue the journey to Texas.
- Lemmon had no intention of remaining in New York or having the enslaved persons reside there longer than necessary to make this transit.
- While awaiting their connecting vessel, the eight enslaved persons were held in a house in New York City.
Procedural Posture:
- A writ of habeas corpus was issued by a judge of the Superior Court of New York City on behalf of eight enslaved persons.
- Jonathan Lemmon, acting for the owner Juliet Lemmon, filed a return to the writ, arguing the individuals were his principal's property and were merely in transit.
- The Superior Court judge rejected this argument and issued an order discharging the individuals, declaring them free.
- Lemmon, as appellant, appealed the order to the General Term of the Supreme Court of New York.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order.
- Lemmon, as appellant, then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a New York statute, which declares free any enslaved person brought into the state, violate the U.S. Constitution when applied to an owner who is temporarily within the state for the sole purpose of transiting from one slaveholding state to another?
Opinions:
Majority - Denio, J.
No. A New York statute declaring free any enslaved person brought into the state does not violate the U.S. Constitution when applied to a slave owner in transit. Each sovereign state has the absolute right to determine the condition of all persons within its jurisdiction and to define what constitutes property. The New York statute is an unequivocal exercise of this power, making any enslaved person brought into the state free. The principle of comity does not compel New York to recognize Virginia's slavery laws when New York's own legislature has explicitly enacted a contrary policy. The Privileges and Immunities Clause only guarantees that citizens of other states receive the same rights as New York citizens, who themselves cannot hold slaves in the state. Finally, this law is not a regulation of commerce but a police power regulation of personal status, and in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, it is valid.
Dissenting - Clerke, J.
Yes. The New York statute is unconstitutional as applied to a citizen in transit. The U.S. Constitution was designed to create a 'more perfect union' that ensures free and unrestricted intercourse among the citizens of the several states, including the right to pass through a state's territory with property. The Constitution recognizes enslaved persons as property, and one state cannot confiscate or liberate property lawfully held by a citizen of another state who is merely passing through. The right of transit, analogous to a principle in the law of nations, becomes a binding 'conventional obligation' under the Constitution that state courts must enforce. Therefore, New York cannot interfere with Lemmon's property rights while she is engaged in interstate travel.
Dissenting - Comstock, Ch. J.
Yes. The Chief Judge dissented without a full opinion, stating that the New York legislation is 'directly opposed to the rules of comity and justice which ought to regulate intercourse between the States.' He was not prepared to hold that the legislation did not violate the obligations imposed by the Federal Constitution and therefore dissented from the judgment.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant assertion of state sovereignty by a free state in the years leading up to the Civil War. It directly challenges the idea that property rights in enslaved people, recognized in Southern states, must be respected nationwide. The ruling creates a direct conflict with the principles of the U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision (1857), which held that slave owners had a constitutional right to take their property into federal territories. The Lemmon case established a powerful precedent in the North that a state's own law could grant freedom to any enslaved person who entered its territory, reinforcing the deep legal and ideological divide between free and slave states over the reach of slavery and the nature of the federal union.
