Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp.
1990 WL 8528, 556 So.2d 559 (1990)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover damages for serious emotional distress resulting from the negligent injury of a third person if the plaintiff either views the injury-causing event or comes upon the scene soon thereafter, the direct victim suffers a traumatic injury that would foreseeably cause such distress, the plaintiff's distress is severe and debilitating, and the plaintiff shares a close relationship with the victim.
Facts:
- Rayo Lejeune was a patient in a comatose state at Rayne Branch Hospital.
- On or about September 25, 1986, a rat entered his room and inflicted multiple bites on his body, including his face and neck.
- His wife, Mable Lejeune, was not present during the incident.
- Shortly after the rat bites occurred, Mable Lejeune entered her husband's hospital room.
- Upon entering, she discovered her husband's fresh wounds and was simultaneously informed by a student nurse that a rat had just bitten him.
Procedural Posture:
- Mable Lejeune sued Rayne Branch Hospital in district court, asserting a claim on behalf of her husband's estate and an individual claim for her own mental anguish.
- The hospital filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, seeking dismissal of Mrs. Lejeune's individual claim for mental anguish.
- The district court (trial court) overruled the hospital's exception, allowing the claim to proceed.
- The hospital, as appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling to the Louisiana Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mrs. Lejeune's cause of action.
- The hospital, as applicant, sought a writ of review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff who is not physically injured or in the zone of danger have a cause of action under Louisiana law for mental pain and anguish resulting from the negligent injury to a closely related third person?
Opinions:
Majority - Calogero, J.
Yes, a plaintiff may have a cause of action for mental pain and anguish resulting from the negligent injury to a third person, even without physical impact or being in the zone of danger. The court overrules the century-old precedent of Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., which barred such claims. Using a duty-risk analysis under La. C.C. art. 2315, the court finds that a duty to protect a third party from severe emotional distress can exist, but it must be circumscribed by clear guidelines to avoid limitless liability. Recovery is permissible only when specific requirements regarding the plaintiff's proximity to the event, the severity of the direct victim's injury, the seriousness of the plaintiff's resulting emotional distress, and the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim are met. In this case, Mrs. Lejeune's discovery of her husband's recent and repulsive injuries satisfies the pleading requirements for this new cause of action.
Concurring - Cole, J.
Yes. While agreeing with the majority's creation of a cause of action, the test for 'serious emotional distress' should be explicitly based on a 'reasonable person' standard, not merely on psychiatric labels which could be misleading. Furthermore, the court should have provided clearer guidance by definitively limiting the class of permissible claimants to close relatives, as defined in the wrongful death statute, rather than leaving the question of relationship open, to prevent an expansion of litigation.
Concurring - Lemmon, J.
Yes. Although a cause of action for mental anguish from negligent injury to a third person should exist, recovery should be narrowly restricted to the same class of beneficiaries entitled to recover damages for wrongful death.
Dissenting - Marcus, J.
No. The hospital's duty of care to its patient does not extend to protecting an uninjured third person, like Mrs. Lejeune, from the risk of mental anguish. Creating this cause of action will lead to an unjustified proliferation of litigation. Even if such a duty were recognized, recovery should be strictly limited to plaintiffs who are within the 'zone of danger' and directly observe the injury-causing event, conditions which Mrs. Lejeune did not meet.
Dissenting - Watson, J.
No. The dissent disagrees with overturning more than a century of established jurisprudence that has consistently denied recovery for such claims.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally altered Louisiana tort law by overruling the long-standing prohibition on bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress established in Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co. The court abandoned a bright-line rule of non-recovery in favor of a guided, policy-based approach, aligning Louisiana with the modern trend in American jurisprudence. By establishing a specific four-part test, the court created a new, albeit limited, cause of action, balancing the compensation of genuine, severe emotional harm with the need to prevent unlimited and potentially fraudulent claims. This case sets a new precedent for how lower courts must analyze claims of mental anguish arising from injury to a third party.
