No, the judge doesn't have to explain. Getting permission to work on a single case in another state is a privilege, not a right. The Constitution only protects rights that are specifically granted by law. Since Ohio law leaves the decision up to the judge's discretion, the lawyers had no guaranteed right that was taken away. Just because judges usually say 'yes' doesn't create a constitutional right that forces them to say 'yes' or hold a hearing if they say 'no'.

Yes, the judge's refusal was unfair. A lawyer's ability to do their job is an important right protected by the Constitution, even if they cross state lines. Ohio courts almost always grant these requests, which creates a reasonable expectation for lawyers that they'll be treated fairly. To suddenly deny permission for no reason is arbitrary and wrong. The judge should have at least given the lawyers a reason for the denial, as required by the constitutional guarantee of fairness (due process).

No, the Constitution doesn't say that out-of-state lawyers can work in Ohio courts. The rules about who can be a lawyer in Ohio are up to Ohio, not the Constitution. Since there's no Ohio law saying these lawyers can definitely work there, they don't have a guaranteed right to do so. This means they don't get special legal protection to argue their case for being allowed to represent their clients in Ohio. The decision also highlights that states have the power to regulate who can practice law and that this power is not overridden by past discretionary practices.

A lawyer's right to do their job is protected by the Constitution, even when they go to another state. The nature of a lawyer's interest in being allowed to practice in another state and Ohio's implied promise based on its usual practice of allowing this are enough to create a protected right. Ohio's assurance that out-of-state lawyers won't be denied permission to practice without a good reason means the lawyers should have a chance to be heard. The Court's decision that a state judge can refuse an out-of-state lawyer's request for any reason is outdated and doesn't recognize the modern reality of lawyers practicing across state lines and defending federal rights. Quickly reversing the lower court's decision is inappropriate for this new constitutional question.

Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions

A constitutional entitlement cannot `be created—as if by estoppel—merely because a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the past

—holding that there was no property interest in the right of admission pro hac vice because Ohio had not created an interest

This view has been rejected by court decisions recognizing that states may regulate the practice of law.

—it held that the right of an out-of-state attorney to appear pro hac vice in a state court does not fall among those interests protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

—and second, that regulation of the practice of law generally has been "left exclusively to the States...."

As this Court has observed on numerous occasions, the Constitution does not create property interests. Rather, it extends various procedural safeguards to certain interests `that stem from an independent source such as state law

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide an out-of-state attorney the right to practice in a particular jurisdiction.

—recognizing, in a case upholding a state court's right to restrict pro hac vice admission of out-of-state attorneys, the "traditional authority of state courts to control who may be admitted to practice before them

T] he Constitution does not require that because a lawyer has been admitted to the bar of one State, he or she must be allowed to practice in another

No, a state court's denial of an out-of-state attorney's application to appear pro hac vice without a hearing does not violate the attorney's rights under the Due Process Clause. The Constitution does not create property interests; rather, such interests must stem from an independent source like state law. Ohio law does not grant out-of-state lawyers an entitlement to appear, instead consigning the decision to the trial court's discretion. The mere prevalence of pro hac vice admissions or the lawyers' subjective expectations do not create a mutually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a constitutionally protected property interest. Because Fahringer and Cambria possessed no cognizable property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ohio courts were not obligated to provide them with procedural due process.

Yes, a state court's denial of an out-of-state attorney's application to appear pro hac vice without a hearing violates the attorney's rights under the Due Process Clause. A lawyer's interest in pursuing their calling is a protected liberty interest that is not abandoned at the state border. This interest is reinforced by Ohio's 'implicit promise' to out-of-state lawyers, established through a consistent custom of granting pro hac vice admissions and state case law suggesting such denials cannot be arbitrary. This custom creates a legitimate expectation that qualifies as a property interest. Therefore, an arbitrary denial of this interest without any procedural safeguard, such as a hearing or statement of reasons, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

No. The Constitution does not create property interests; it protects interests that stem from an independent source such as state law. Ohio has no specific standards regarding pro hac vice admissions, and the practice of allowing out-of-state lawyers to appear pro hac vice is not a right granted by statute or the Constitution. The licensing and regulation of lawyers have been left exclusively to the States. Fahringer and Cambria did not possess a cognizable property interest within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, the Constitution does not obligate Ohio courts to accord them procedural due process in passing on their application for permission to appear pro hac vice. The Court also emphasized the traditional authority of state courts to control who may be admitted to practice before them.

A lawyer's interest in pursuing his calling is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when he crosses state borders. The nature of the lawyer's interest in pro hac vice admissions and Ohio's implicit promise inherent in its custom of allowing such admissions are sufficient to create a protected interest. Ohio's assurance that out-of-state lawyers will not be arbitrarily denied pro hac vice admission gives rise to a procedural requirement that the affected lawyers have some opportunity to be heard. The Court's holding that a state trial judge has arbitrary and unlimited power to refuse a nonresident lawyer permission to appear is a remnant of a bygone era that fails to recognize the modern realities of interstate law practice and the vindication of federal rights. Summary reversal is inappropriate for this novel constitutional question.

Leis v. Flynt

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