Leider v. Lewis
2 Cal.5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
A taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a cannot be used to obtain injunctive relief against public expenditures that support alleged criminal conduct, because § 526a does not constitute a specific statutory exception to the general rule, codified in Civil Code § 3369, that equity will not enjoin the enforcement of a penal law.
Facts:
- The Los Angeles Zoo, operated by the City of Los Angeles and its Director, John Lewis, housed several elephants.
- Taxpayers Robert Culp and Aaron Leider alleged that the Zoo was engaging in abusive behavior toward its elephants.
- The alleged abuse included disciplining the elephants through methods such as the use of electricity, physical punishment resulting in scarring, and the use of bullhooks.
- Leider also alleged the Zoo was keeping the elephants in an enclosure without proper care and attention by failing to exercise them and rototill their enclosure regularly.
- The City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, was using public funds to operate the zoo and care for the elephants in this allegedly illegal manner.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Culp and Aaron Leider sued the City of Los Angeles and Zoo Director John Lewis in state trial court, seeking injunctive relief under Code of Civil Procedure § 526a.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling the claims were nonjusticiable political questions.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed, and the Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court) reversed and remanded, finding a triable issue of fact.
- On remand, Leider filed an amended complaint.
- The City demurred based on Civil Code § 3369, but the trial court overruled the demurrer, holding the argument was barred by the law of the case doctrine from the first appeal.
- After a bench trial, the trial court found for Leider and issued an injunction against the City.
- The City (appellant) appealed, and a divided Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of California granted review.
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Issue:
Does the general authorization for taxpayer actions to restrain illegal public expenditures under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a qualify as an exception 'as otherwise provided by law' under Civil Code section 3369, thereby permitting a court to grant injunctive relief against a municipality for alleged violations of the Penal Code?
Opinions:
Majority - Corrigan, J.
No. The general authorization for taxpayer actions in Code of Civil Procedure § 526a does not create a specific statutory exception to the long-standing rule, codified in Civil Code § 3369, that courts of equity will not grant injunctive relief to enforce a penal law. The fundamental rule that courts of equity are not concerned with criminal matters serves to protect a defendant's rights to a jury trial and the higher 'beyond a reasonable doubt' burden of proof that apply in criminal prosecutions. It also upholds the principle of prosecutorial discretion, which gives public prosecutors, not private citizens, the sole power to decide whether to enforce criminal laws. The court's precedent in Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica held that a taxpayer action could not be used to enjoin a city from licensing games that allegedly violated the Penal Code. The 1977 amendment to § 3369, which added the 'as otherwise provided by law' exception, was a non-substantive, technical change and its legislative history shows no intent to overturn the established rule from Schur. For a law to serve as an exception to § 3369, it must contain both a definition of the prohibited conduct and a specific provision authorizing equitable relief; the general language of § 526a concerning 'illegal expenditure' is insufficient to meet this requirement.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and strengthens the high bar for using civil injunctions to address alleged criminal law violations by public entities. It clarifies that a general statute, such as the taxpayer action statute (§ 526a), is insufficient to override the specific prohibition against enjoining penal laws found in Civil Code § 3369. This ruling significantly curtails the ability of citizen and activist groups to use taxpayer lawsuits as a tool to challenge government actions by framing them as violations of criminal law. The decision forces such challenges to rely on the discretion of public prosecutors or on other, more specific statutory remedies that explicitly authorize injunctive relief, thereby preserving the separation between civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms.
