Lehmann v. Wieghat
1996 WL 50561, 917 S.W.2d 379 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages as a bystander if they learn of the accident from a third party immediately before witnessing the victim's injuries. A direct, unmediated sensory perception of the accident or its immediate aftermath is required, as distinguished from learning about the event from others.
Facts:
- Richard Lehmann and his 22-year-old son, Darrin, went deer hunting on their family farm with Carlton Wieghat.
- Wieghat and Darrin went off to hunt in Wieghat's truck, while Richard Lehmann remained at the camp-house.
- Wieghat mistook Darrin for a deer and shot him, causing serious injury.
- At the time of the shooting, Richard Lehmann was at the camp-house, between half a mile and a mile and a half away from the scene.
- Richard Lehmann heard the shot but did not know his son had been injured.
- Wieghat put Darrin in his truck and drove back toward the camp, taking approximately five to ten minutes.
- Richard Lehmann met Wieghat's approaching truck at a gate.
- Upon meeting, Wieghat told Richard Lehmann, 'I shot Darrin,' after which Lehmann immediately saw his son bleeding in the bed of the truck.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard E. Lehmann (appellant) filed a lawsuit against Carlton L. Wieghat (appellee) in a Texas state trial court, seeking damages for emotional distress as a bystander.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- The jury returned a verdict finding that Wieghat was negligent but that Lehmann did not meet the bystander requirements of being 'near the scene' or having a 'sensory and contemporaneous perception' of the accident.
- Based on the jury's findings of no liability for a bystander claim, the jury awarded Lehmann zero damages.
- The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Wieghat.
- Lehmann appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who is located up to a mile and a half from an accident, hears a gunshot without comprehending its significance, and is then verbally informed of his son's injury by the tortfeasor moments before seeing the victim, satisfy the legal requirements of being 'near the scene' and having a 'sensory and contemporaneous perception' to qualify for a bystander claim for emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Amidei
No, a plaintiff in these circumstances does not satisfy the requirements for a bystander claim. To recover for bystander emotional distress, a plaintiff's shock must result from a direct emotional impact from a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, not from learning about it from others. The court reasoned that because Richard Lehmann was told 'I shot Darrin' by Carlton Wieghat immediately before he saw his son, he learned of the accident from another person, which breaks the required chain of direct, experiential perception. This distinguishes his case from prior ones where plaintiffs were permitted to recover after unwittingly discovering the victim themselves. Furthermore, his distance from the scene (up to a mile and a half) made it a proper question for the jury to decide whether he was 'near the scene,' and the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that he was not.
Analysis:
This decision refines and arguably narrows the scope of bystander liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Texas. The court establishes a critical distinction between discovering an accident scene independently and being told about it, even moments before witnessing the aftermath. By holding that verbal communication of the event breaks the 'sensory and contemporaneous perception' requirement, the case creates a clearer, albeit stricter, boundary for such claims. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs who are not direct, immediate witnesses to recover, emphasizing that the method of learning about the trauma is as important as the proximity in time and distance.
