Yes. The city can refuse the political ad. A train car isn't like a public park or a street corner, where people expect to hear different opinions. It's part of a business the city is running. The riders are a 'captive audience'—they're stuck there and can't easily walk away from the ads. The city has a right to protect them from potentially controversial political messages and to avoid looking like it's taking sides in an election. It's just a reasonable business decision.

Yes. The city can refuse the ad, mainly because of the passengers' rights. People riding a bus or train are forced to be there to get to work or home. They shouldn't be forced to look at messages they don't want to see. It's an invasion of their privacy to turn the bus into a billboard for any idea, whether it's political or not. Protecting this 'captive audience' is the most important thing.

No. The city should have accepted the ad. As soon as the city started selling ad space for *any* kind of message, it turned the train cars into a public space for speech. Once you open that door, you can't slam it shut on political speech, which is the most protected kind of speech. Banning political ads while allowing commercial ads is unfair discrimination. If passengers don't like an ad, they can simply look away.

The city can choose not to allow political ads on its buses without violating the Constitution. The bus system is a business, not a public space for debates. The city can reasonably decide to avoid the problems that political ads might cause, like upsetting passengers or making it seem like the city favors certain candidates. This isn't discrimination, because the city is allowed to make rules about what kinds of ads are okay in its buses.

By allowing any ads on its buses, the city created a space for people to communicate and share messages. Once they did that, the Constitution says they can't discriminate based on what the ads say. The city didn't prove it had a really good reason to ban political ads or that its rules were narrow and fair. Its excuses, like protecting trapped passengers and avoiding looking biased, aren't convincing. I would have ruled the opposite way and said the city can't ban political ads on its buses.

A bus isn't like a public park or sidewalk where people go to discuss ideas - it's just transportation. Bus passengers are a trapped audience who can't avoid seeing the ads inside. They have a right to not have messages forced on them in that situation. So the city can keep political ads off its buses. I agree with the Court's decision that the candidate doesn't have a constitutional right to make the bus passengers see his political message.

It must provide rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive service to the commuters... The [advertising] space, although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of the commercial venture...[A] city transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its vehicles.

—a plurality of the Court concluded that a city transit system's rental of space in its vehicles for commercial advertising did not require it to accept partisan political advertising.

In fact, Justice BLACKMUN recognized in Lehman that: "Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require."

In the twenty six years that the city had operated the transit company, it had not accepted or permitted any "political or public issue advertising" on its vehicles.

—we upheld a city law that permitted commercial advertising, but prohibited political advertising, on city buses.

Accordingly, our decisions have long recognized that the government may impose some content-based restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums, including restrictions that exclude political advocates and forms of political advocacy.

The city consciously has limited access to its transit system advertising space in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.

In contrast to a public forum, a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not mandated.

When the government acts in a commercial or proprietary capacity, as WIAA does with respect to the tournament games it sponsors, it weighs strongly against finding that the government has created a public forum or that regulation of speech within that forum is subject to strict scrutiny.

—advertising space on public street-cars is not a "First Amendment forum" like a "park," and a streetcar "captive audience" is in a situation "different from the traditional settings where First Amendment values inalterably prevail

No. A city's refusal to accept paid political advertising on its transit system does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments because the car card space is not a public forum. The city is engaged in a commercial venture and may make reasonable managerial decisions about the types of advertising it accepts. The court reasoned that a transit car is fundamentally different from a traditional public forum like a park or street corner. Instead, the city is acting in a proprietary capacity, much like a private newspaper or broadcaster, with discretion over its advertising content. The court also emphasized the protection of the 'captive audience' of commuters, who are a matter of necessity, not choice, and can be shielded from the 'blare of political propaganda.' The city's policy was a reasonable decision to minimize controversy, avoid the appearance of political favoritism, and prevent administrative difficulties, and was not arbitrary or invidious.

No. The judgment should be affirmed because the primary constitutional consideration is the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy. A bus or streetcar is not a public forum but a necessary mode of transport for a captive audience. This audience is incapable of declining to receive the messages displayed, whether they are visual or auricular. Therefore, a passenger's right to privacy precludes the government from transforming public vehicles into forums for the dissemination of any ideas, political or commercial, upon this captive audience.

Yes. The city's policy of excluding political advertising violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By accepting commercial and public service advertisements, the city created a public forum for communication and cannot constitutionally discriminate among users based on message content. Political speech lies at the core of the First Amendment and should not be subordinated to 'bland commercialism.' The 'captive audience' justification is unpersuasive because passengers can easily avert their eyes from a written advertisement, unlike an unavoidable audio broadcast. The city's concerns about appearing to endorse a candidate could be addressed through less restrictive, content-neutral means, such as requiring disclaimers.

No, the city's decision to limit advertising space to commercial and service-oriented advertising does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The city's transit system is a commercial venture, not a public forum, and the city may reasonably decide to minimize the risks associated with political advertising, such as the disruption of revenue, the imposition of political propaganda on a captive audience, and administrative difficulties. This decision does not amount to a First Amendment violation because the city's actions are not arbitrary, capricious, or invidious. The city has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its vehicles, and this discretion extends to excluding political advocates and forms of political advocacy in nonpublic forums.

The city created a forum for communication when it accepted and displayed commercial and public service advertisements on its rapid transit vehicles. Having opened a forum for communication, the city is barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments from discriminating among forum users solely on the basis of message content. The city failed to show that its selective exclusion of political advertising was justified by a compelling government interest or that it constituted a narrowly drawn time, place, and manner regulation. The city's justifications, such as protecting captive audiences and avoiding the appearance of political favoritism, are unpersuasive. The dissent would reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio.

A bus is not a public forum akin to a park or sidewalk, but rather a means of transportation. The constitutional rights of commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its public transportation vehicles into forums for the dissemination of ideas to a captive audience. Passengers on public transit are a captive audience, unable to avoid messages displayed inside the vehicles. The concurrence agrees with the Court's judgment, as the petitioner has no constitutional right to spread his message before this captive audience.

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights

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