Legille v. Dann
544 F.2d 1, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 191 U.S.P.Q. 529 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
A rebuttable presumption, such as the timely delivery of mail, is a procedural device that disappears once the opposing party introduces sufficient countervailing evidence; the case must then be decided by the trier of fact based on the weight of all the evidence presented.
Facts:
- On March 1, 1973, an attorney for Legille and other applicants mailed a package containing four patent applications from East Hartford, Connecticut, to the U.S. Patent Office in Washington, D.C.
- The package was properly addressed, marked 'Airmail,' and had sufficient postage.
- The normal delivery time for airmail from East Hartford to Washington at that time was two days.
- Three of the applications were based on foreign patents that had been filed on March 6, 1972, creating a one-year statutory deadline for U.S. filing of March 6, 1973.
- The Patent Office date-stamped the applications as received on March 8, 1973.
- A filing date of March 8, 1973, would render three of the four applications untimely and thus invalid.
Procedural Posture:
- Legille and other applicants (appellees) petitioned the Commissioner of Patents to reassign the filing date of their applications from March 8 to an earlier date, but the petition was denied.
- The applicants sued the Commissioner of Patents (appellant) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking an order to change the filing date.
- Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the applicants, holding that the presumption of timely mail delivery was not overcome by the Commissioner's evidence of office procedure.
- The Commissioner of Patents appealed the District Court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does evidence of an agency's routine mail-handling procedures, which indicate a later date of receipt, create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to rebut the presumption that a properly mailed item was delivered in due course, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Spottswood W. Robinson, III
Yes. Evidence of an agency's routine and systematic mail-handling procedures is sufficient to rebut the presumption of timely mail delivery and create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The court adopted the 'bursting bubble' theory of presumptions, which holds that a rebuttable presumption is not evidence in itself but a procedural rule that shifts the burden of production. Once the party against whom the presumption is directed offers sufficient evidence to the contrary, the presumption disappears, and the factfinder must weigh the underlying evidence from both parties. Here, the Patent Office's detailed affidavit describing its mail-stamping procedures constituted sufficient countervailing evidence to the presumption of timely delivery arising from the proper mailing. Therefore, the dispute over the actual date of receipt is a genuine issue of material fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment and must proceed to trial.
Dissenting - Fahy
No. The evidence of the Patent Office's general procedures is insufficient to overcome the strong legal presumption that a properly mailed item is received in the ordinary course of the mails. The dissent argues that this strong presumption can only be rebutted by 'direct and positive proof of affirmative facts' concerning the specific mail in question, not by 'negative evidence' of general custom and habit. The Patent Office's affidavit merely described its routine and did not provide any specific information about the handling of the applicants' package. Furthermore, the affidavit failed to establish when the mail was placed in the Patent Office's post office pouch, which under its own rules could constitute the date of receipt. Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact was created, and the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the applicants should have been affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision formally adopts the 'bursting bubble' theory of presumptions for the D.C. Circuit, aligning it with the dominant view in federal courts and the framework of Federal Rule of Evidence 301. The case clarifies that presumptions are not evidence and do not 'battle' each other; rather, they are procedural tools that vanish when confronted with sufficient contradictory evidence. This holding prevents parties from winning on summary judgment solely by relying on a presumption when the opposing side can produce credible evidence of its routine procedures. It ensures that genuine factual disputes, such as the actual delivery date of a document, are resolved by a factfinder at trial, who can weigh the credibility of all underlying evidence.
