Lee v. Paulsen
539 P.2d 1079, 1975 Ore. LEXIS 307, 273 Or. 103 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The publication of a defamatory statement is absolutely privileged if the plaintiff consents to or requests the publication, provided the plaintiff knows the exact content of the statement prior to its publication.
Facts:
- A nontenured teacher, the plaintiff, was notified that his employment contract would not be renewed.
- The plaintiff's attorney wrote to the school district, requesting the specific reasons for the nonrenewal and asking for a public hearing.
- In response, the school district's attorney sent a letter detailing the specific reasons for the nonrenewal.
- The letter also explicitly stated that no school officials would be available for questioning at the hearing.
- The plaintiff read this letter and was fully aware of its contents.
- At the subsequent public hearing, the plaintiff’s attorney requested that the school board read aloud the reasons for nonrenewal as they were written in the letter.
- The school board complied with the request and read the statements from the letter.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff teacher filed a defamation action against defendant school officials and board members in a state trial court.
- At trial, the defendants moved for an involuntary nonsuit, arguing the publication was absolutely privileged.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the case.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to grant the nonsuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff's request for the public reading of a statement create an absolute privilege for the publisher against a defamation claim, when the plaintiff had prior knowledge of the exact defamatory language that would be published?
Opinions:
Majority - Denecke, J.
Yes, a plaintiff's request for the public reading of a statement creates an absolute privilege against a defamation claim when the plaintiff knew the exact language in advance. The court holds that consent to publication is an absolute privilege, based on the principle that courts are unwilling to allow a plaintiff to lay the foundation for their own lawsuit for pecuniary gain. This privilege applies when the plaintiff invites or instigates the publication. A critical element is the plaintiff's prior knowledge of the exact language to be published. The court distinguished this situation from one where a person makes an honest inquiry to discover the source or content of a rumor, which would not be privileged. Here, the plaintiff and his attorney knew precisely what was in the letter and that no further explanation would be given, yet they still requested its public reading, thereby consenting to the publication and barring their own defamation claim. The plaintiff's subjective intent to 'set up' a lawsuit is not a required element for the privilege to apply.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the defense of consent as an absolute privilege in defamation law. It establishes a clear and critical prerequisite for this defense: the plaintiff must know the exact contents of the defamatory statement they are inviting to be published. This clarification creates a bright-line rule that distinguishes actionable republications from those invited by the plaintiff, thereby preventing individuals from engineering their own defamation lawsuits. The ruling strengthens protections for defendants who are compelled by a plaintiff's own request to repeat a statement, and it will guide future courts in distinguishing genuine inquiries from contrived publications.
