Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority
605 N.E.2d 493, 178 Ill. Dec. 699, 152 Ill. 2d 432 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A possessor of land owes a duty of ordinary care to warn a trespasser of a highly dangerous artificial condition if the possessor knows or has reason to know of the trespasser's presence in dangerous proximity to the condition and has reason to believe the trespasser will not discover the condition or realize the risk involved.
Facts:
- On October 21, 1977, Sang Yeul Lee, a 46-year-old immigrant who could not read English, attended a party.
- After the party, Lee became severely intoxicated, reaching a blood-alcohol level of 0.341.
- On his way home, Lee entered a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) right-of-way at a street-level crossing, apparently to urinate.
- The CTA right-of-way was posted with signs warning of 'Danger,' 'Keep Out,' and 'Electric Current,' but did not specify the location or nature of the hazard.
- Approximately 6.5 feet from the public sidewalk lay an electrified, street-level third rail carrying 600 volts of power.
- To deter pedestrians, the CTA had installed uneven boards, known as 'jaws' or 'cattle boards,' on the ground between the sidewalk and the tracks.
- In the 29 years prior to Lee's death, the CTA was aware of 10 accidents involving the 3.2-mile segment of its track where the third rail ran at grade level.
- Lee came into contact with the electrified third rail and suffered fatal injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Jae Boon Lee's estate sued the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) in the circuit court of Cook County for wrongful death, alleging negligence and willful/wanton conduct.
- A jury found for the plaintiff on the negligence count, awarding $3 million, but reduced the award by 50% based on the decedent's own negligence; it found the CTA's conduct was not willful or wanton.
- The CTA, as appellant, appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.
- The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, finding the CTA owed no duty of ordinary care to a trespasser, and entered judgment for the CTA.
- The plaintiff, as petitioner, sought and was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does a landowner owe a duty of ordinary care to a trespasser when the landowner maintains a highly dangerous artificial condition and can reasonably anticipate the trespasser's presence in a place of danger?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Freeman
Yes, a landowner who maintains a highly dangerous artificial condition owes a duty of ordinary care to warn a trespasser if the landowner knows or has reason to know of the trespasser's presence in dangerous proximity to the condition and has reason to believe the trespasser will not discover the risk. The court formally adopts Section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an exception to the general rule that landowners only owe trespassers a duty to refrain from willful and wanton injury. The CTA had 'reason to know' of the presence of trespassers due to the third rail's close proximity to a public sidewalk and its knowledge of 10 prior accidents in the area. Furthermore, the CTA had reason to believe a trespasser would not discover the specific danger, as the general warning signs did not indicate the existence, location, or nature of the electrified third rail. The societal need to protect people from the foreseeable risk of death or severe injury from such a condition outweighs the landowner's traditional freedom from duty to a trespasser.
Dissenting - Justice Moran
No, the CTA did not owe a duty of ordinary care because the knowledge requirement of Section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not satisfied. The majority ignores Comment a to Section 337, which clarifies that the landowner must know the trespasser is 'about to come in contact' with the dangerous condition. The CTA's general knowledge of prior accidents over a 3.2-mile stretch, with no accidents at this specific location in the 15 months prior, does not constitute the 'foreseeability in fact' required by the rule. The majority's broad application of the rule effectively makes landowners absolute insurers for the safety of trespassers.
Dissenting - Justice Heiple
No, the Chicago Transit Authority should not be held liable, as the jury's findings on fault and damages were grossly erroneous. The decedent's extreme level of intoxication (0.341 BAC) and his decision to walk past multiple warning signs and physical deterrents made him overwhelmingly responsible for his own death. The jury's 50/50 allocation of fault and the $3 million damage award are products of sympathy and prejudice, not reason. This outcome exemplifies a tort system that functions like a 'casino,' where unquantifiable damages like 'loss of society' lead to excessive verdicts that cripple society.
Analysis:
This decision formally adopts Section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts into Illinois law, creating a significant new exception to the traditional premises liability rule for trespassers. The court broadens the concept of 'reason to know' beyond knowledge of a specific trespasser at a specific time, allowing it to be satisfied by general foreseeability based on prior incidents and the physical characteristics of the property. This ruling increases the duty of care for landowners, such as utility and transportation companies, who maintain highly dangerous artificial conditions, requiring them to provide more specific and adequate warnings to protect even anticipated trespassers from non-obvious risks.
