Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital
237 Ill. 2d 217, 341 Ill. Dec. 381, 930 N.E.2d 895 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions constitutes an unconstitutional legislative remittitur that violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution by unduly infringing upon the judiciary's inherent authority to assess the excessiveness of jury verdicts on a case-by-case basis.
Facts:
- Frances Lebrón was pregnant and under the care of Dr. Roberto Levi-D’Ancona.
- On October 31, 2005, Lebrón was admitted to Gottlieb Memorial Hospital for delivery.
- Dr. Levi-D’Ancona delivered Lebrón's daughter, Abigaile, by Caesarean section.
- Florence Martinoz, a registered nurse, assisted in the delivery and provided nursing care.
- As a result of acts and omissions during her delivery, Abigaile Lebrón sustained numerous permanent injuries.
- Abigaile's injuries included severe brain injury, cerebral palsy, cognitive mental impairment, and the inability to be fed normally.
Procedural Posture:
- Abigaile Lebrón and Frances Lebrón filed a lawsuit against Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, Dr. Roberto Levi-D’Ancona, and Nurse Florence Martinoz in the Cook County circuit court (a trial court).
- The complaint included medical malpractice claims and a count seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in Public Act 94-677 was unconstitutional.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings regarding the constitutionality of the damage caps.
- The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion, ruling that the statutory cap violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.
- Based on the Act's inseverability clause, the circuit court declared the entire Public Act 94-677 invalid.
- The defendants, Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, Florence Martinoz, and Dr. Levi-D'Ancona, as appellants, filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does section 2-1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which imposes a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions, violate the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Fitzgerald
Yes, section 2-1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The statute functions as an unconstitutional 'legislative remittitur' by mandating a reduction of a jury's award of noneconomic damages without regard to the specific facts and circumstances of the case. The power of remittitur—to determine whether a jury's award is excessive—is a traditional and inherent power of the judicial branch, to be exercised on a case-by-case basis. By imposing a mandatory, one-size-fits-all cap, the legislature unduly encroaches upon this fundamentally judicial prerogative. This holding is controlled by the court's prior decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, and the fact that the current statute is narrower in scope does not cure the constitutional violation.
Dissenting - Justice Karmeier
No, section 2-1706.5 does not violate the separation of powers clause. The statutory cap on damages is not a 'remittitur'; rather, it is a valid exercise of the legislature's inherent authority to define and modify the common law and its available remedies in response to a perceived public health crisis. A judicial remittitur involves a court re-examining the facts of a specific case, whereas a statutory cap is a substantive policy decision that prospectively defines the limits of liability as a matter of law. The majority's reliance on the separation of powers analysis in Best is misplaced as it was dicta, and its reasoning has been rejected by virtually every other state and federal court to consider the issue. The court should defer to the General Assembly's considered judgment on a matter of public policy.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the precedent from Best v. Taylor Machine Works, establishing a powerful barrier in Illinois against legislative caps on compensatory damages. The court's adherence to the 'legislative remittitur' theory entrenches a state constitutional doctrine that is distinct from the jurisprudence in most other states, which have upheld similar caps as a valid exercise of legislative power. The ruling significantly constrains tort reform efforts in Illinois, forcing the legislature to find alternative methods to address medical malpractice costs without imposing direct monetary caps on noneconomic damages. It reinforces the Illinois judiciary's robust view of its own inherent powers against legislative encroachment.
