LeBlanc v. Cleveland
1999 WL 1138523, 198 F.3d 353 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
For federal admiralty jurisdiction to exist over a tort claim, the waterway on which the tort occurred must be navigable in fact for interstate commerce in its present condition. Artificial obstructions, such as dams, that make a waterway impassable for commercial maritime activity will defeat admiralty jurisdiction, regardless of the waterway's historical navigability.
Facts:
- On July 4, 1994, Etoile LeBlanc and Stephen Ossen were paddling a kayak they had rented from JRD Retailers, Ltd. on the Hudson River.
- Their kayak was struck by a recreational motorboat operated by Terry Cleveland and owned by Robert Grant, causing personal injuries to LeBlanc and Ossen.
- The collision occurred on the Hudson River near Lake Luzerne, approximately 29 miles upstream of Fort Edward, New York.
- This particular section of the Hudson River is geographically isolated from any interstate or international waterway.
- Travel downstream to the navigable parts of the river is blocked by numerous rapids, at least three major waterfalls, and nine man-made dams.
- Prior to 1951 and the construction of several dams, this section of the river was used by the logging industry to float timber to mills.
Procedural Posture:
- Etoile LeBlanc and Stephen Ossen filed a lawsuit against Robert Grant and Terry Cleveland in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, invoking federal admiralty jurisdiction.
- The action was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.
- Grant and Cleveland filed third-party complaints against JRD Retailers, Ltd. (JRD).
- JRD filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The district court granted the motion, concluding it lacked admiralty jurisdiction because the relevant section of the Hudson River was not a navigable waterway.
- LeBlanc and Ossen (appellants) appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a section of a river that is currently impassable for commercial maritime activity due to natural and artificial obstructions qualify as a 'navigable waterway' for the purpose of establishing federal admiralty jurisdiction, even if it was historically used for commerce?
Opinions:
Majority - Parker, Circuit Judge
No. A waterway is navigable for admiralty jurisdiction purposes only if it is presently used, or is presently capable of being used, as a highway for interstate commercial trade. Natural and artificial obstructions that effectively prohibit such commerce defeat admiralty jurisdiction. The primary purpose of admiralty jurisdiction is to protect commercial shipping with uniform rules, a purpose not served by extending jurisdiction to waters devoid of such commerce. The court rejected the appellants' argument for a 'historic navigability' standard, distinguishing the test for admiralty jurisdiction from the broader navigability test used for Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. While a dam does not divest Congress of its power to regulate a potentially useful artery of commerce, it does eliminate the basis for admiralty jurisdiction if it has the practical effect of ending commercial maritime activity. Therefore, the possibility of recreational use, such as kayaking and portaging around dams, is insufficient to establish the waterway's capability for supporting commercial maritime activity required for jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a crucial distinction between the definition of 'navigability' for Commerce Clause purposes versus admiralty jurisdiction. By adopting a 'contemporary navigability' standard, the Second Circuit aligns with other federal circuits, ensuring that admiralty jurisdiction is tied to the practical reality of current commercial activity rather than historical use. This ruling effectively limits the expansion of federal admiralty law into local, non-commercial torts occurring on landlocked or obstructed bodies of water, preserving the role of state courts in resolving such disputes. The case serves as a clear precedent that man-made obstructions can terminate federal maritime jurisdiction over a waterway.
