Yes, what Texas did in District 23 was illegal. The court said you can't just take away a minority group's fair shot at electing someone when they're on the verge of doing it. The new long, skinny district didn't fix the problem because it was just a mash-up of two very different communities that only had their race in common. A real community shares local interests, and these two groups were too far apart and too different to be a genuine voting community. Therefore, Texas illegally weakened Latino voting power.

No, Texas did nothing wrong. The new map actually gave Latinos a chance to win in more districts than the old one did. The majority is being too picky about the shape of one district while ignoring the fact that Latino voters gained power overall in the region. It's the legislature's job, not a court's, to decide the exact lines of voting districts.

Yes, and the entire map should be thrown out. The only reason Republicans redrew the map was for pure political greed to give themselves an unfair advantage. That's not how government is supposed to work. It's cheating, and the courts have a duty to stop it. This wasn't about regular politics; it was a hostile partisan takeover of the election process.

I mostly agree with the lower court that the new voting districts were okay, but I said one area, District 23, was changed in a way that wasn't fair to Latino voters. I also mentioned that states don't have to make 'influence districts' for minority voters.

I think the whole new map was wrong because it was made just to help one political party, which isn't allowed. I also talked about how important it is to be fair to everyone, no matter if the unfairness is based on politics or race.

I didn't agree with how the majority looked at the situation and thought the new map did hurt the voting power of certain groups.

I believed the new map was really bad for one political party's voters, which isn't fair.

I agreed with some parts but didn't think the new map was unfair to Latino voters. I also said that a map that shows how strong each party is in the state is less likely to be unfairly biased.

I thought the Court shouldn't even be deciding if the map was made to help one political party, even though most of the Court didn't want to say that these kinds of complaints can't be decided by courts.

The Supreme Court has explicitly found that Section 2c falls within that authority: "Congress, as the text of the Constitution also provides, may set further requirements, and with respect to districting it has generally required single-member districts."

The Court there declined to revisit Bandemer's justiciability holding, but five Justices, although unable to join a single opinion, agreed that the plaintiffs' theory—which focused on the mid-decennial nature of the redistricting at issue—failed to "offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the …

—the Court's controlling opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, held that section 2 of the VRA does not require a state to draw "influence" districts—that is, districts that allow minority voters, who cannot form a reasonably compact majority-minority district, to have the "ability to influence the outcome between some candidates."

In a recent Texas redistricting case, the Court treated "Latinos" as a "racial group" able to assert a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

A plurality of the Court in Vieth would have held [political gerrymandering] challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority declined to do so

A] congressional plan that more closely reflects the distribution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than one that entrenches an electoral minority

—and it observed that that the " `political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination'... may well [have] `hinder [ed] their ability to participate effectively in the political process,'"

First is that "the racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."

Equal protection is at the heart of both partisan and racial gerrymandering or vote dilution claims.

Partisan symmetry purports to "measure partisan bias by compar [ing] how both parties would fare hypothetically if they each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote."

Yes. Dismantling an existing district in which a racial minority was poised to elect its candidate of choice violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act where the State's proffered remedy is a new, non-compact district that merges distant and disparate communities. The Court found that the redrawing of District 23 diluted the voting strength of its Latino residents. Under the three-part Gingles test, the Latino community in the original District 23 was sufficiently large and compact, politically cohesive, and faced bloc voting from the Anglo majority. The State dismantled this emerging opportunity district precisely because the Latino voters were on the verge of exercising their power to defeat the incumbent. The State's creation of the new District 25 was not an adequate remedy because it was not reasonably compact for § 2 purposes. Section 2 compactness considers not just geographic shape but also whether the district maintains genuine 'communities of interest.' Combining two disparate Latino communities, separated by 300 miles and with different socio-economic needs, did not create a functional opportunity district but merely aggregated a racial group on paper. Looking at the totality of the circumstances—including Texas's history of voting discrimination and the fact that the State took away the Latinos' opportunity precisely when they were about to exercise it—the plan violated § 2. The Court affirmed the rejection of the statewide partisan gerrymandering claims, finding no manageable standard, and the § 2 claim regarding District 24.

No. The state's redistricting plan for south and west Texas did not violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The District Court's factual findings showed that the state's plan increased the number of effective Latino opportunity districts in the region from five to six. The majority improperly substitutes its own theory about compactness for the trial court's factual findings that the new District 25 was a more effective Latino opportunity district than the old District 23 had been. The court's inquiry should be whether the line-drawing as a whole dilutes minority voting strength, not whether one district viewed 'in isolation' has flaws. By striking down a plan that achieves the maximum possible number of majority-minority districts, the Court ventures far from the Voting Rights Act's purpose of ensuring equal opportunity and improperly intrudes on the State's legislative discretion.

Yes. The entire redistricting plan (Plan 1374C) is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and should be invalidated. The Texas legislature's decision to discard a neutral, court-drawn plan mid-decade for the sole purpose of maximizing its own party's political advantage serves no legitimate public purpose and violates the State's constitutional duty to govern impartially. Unlike claims arising from regular decennial redistricting, the motive here is not mixed; the 'single-minded purpose' was to gain partisan advantage. This purely partisan motivation is an improper basis for state action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore, the plan had a severe discriminatory effect, creating a durable Republican majority that is insulated from shifts in voter preference.

I affirm the District Court's decision on the statewide political gerrymandering claims and the Voting Rights Act claim against District 24. However, I reverse and remand on the Voting Rights Act claim with respect to District 23, finding that the redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting Latino voting strength in that district. I also note that the creation of 'influence districts' is not mandated by the Voting Rights Act.

I argue that the entire redistricting plan was unconstitutional as it was enacted solely for partisan gain, without any legitimate governmental purpose, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. I also note the importance of equal protection in both partisan and racial gerrymandering claims.

I dissent from the majority's decision on the vote dilution claims, arguing that the majority's analysis was incorrect and that the plan did dilute minority voting strength in violation of the Voting Rights Act.

I dissent, stating that the redistricting plan imposed a severe burden on the electoral opportunities of Democrats in Texas, which violated the Equal Protection Clause.

I agree with the majority on the political gerrymandering claims but dissent from the majority's decision on the Voting Rights Act claims, arguing that the State's plan did not dilute Latino voting strength. I also emphasize that a congressional plan that reflects the distribution of state party power is less likely to be a vehicle for partisan discrimination.

I concur in part with the judgment but dissent on the grounds that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering do not present a justiciable case or controversy, despite a majority of the Court declining to hold such challenges as nonjusticiable.

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry

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