Le Barron v. State
32 Wis. 2d 294, 1966 Wisc. LEXIS 909, 145 N.W.2d 79 (1966)
Rule of Law:
An attempt to commit a crime, such as attempted rape, requires proof of intent to commit the full crime and overt acts demonstrating that intent, which would have succeeded "except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor," even if that factor is intrinsic to the victim's condition and unknown to the assailant.
Facts:
- On March 3, 1965, at 6:55 p.m., Jodean Randen was walking home across a railroad bridge in Eau Claire.
- A man, later identified as the defendant, approached Randen, grabbed her arm, demanded her purse, and then, finding it empty, caught up to her again, threatening not to hurt her if she did not scream.
- The man led Randen to a nearby coal shack, shoving her head down and warning her not to look up.
- Inside the shack, he placed a hand over her mouth and an arm around her shoulder, threatening to kill her if she screamed, stating, "You know what else I want," unzipped his pants, and started pulling up her skirt.
- Randen then succeeded in removing his hand from her mouth and pleaded with him to desist, revealing she was pregnant and asking him not to hurt her baby.
- The man felt her stomach, then took her to the shack door where, in better light, he observed her maternity clothes under her coat.
- He subsequently ceased his actions, let Randen go, and warned her not to scream or call the police.
- Randen proceeded to a restaurant, called her husband, and upon reaching home, her husband called the police, leading to the defendant's arrest and identification based on Randen's description.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged in a trial court with the crime of attempted rape.
- At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and feeblemindedness, and also presented an alibi defense.
- The trial court appointed two psychiatrists who examined the defendant and testified that he was neither insane nor feebleminded.
- The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted rape.
- The defendant subsequently appealed his conviction to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove attempted rape and that his trial counsel's handling of the defense denied him a fair trial.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's desistance from attempting sexual intercourse, prompted by the victim's revelation of pregnancy, qualify as an "extraneous factor" under Wisconsin Statute § 939.32(2) sufficient to support a conviction for attempted rape, even if the pregnancy was intrinsic to the victim and unknown to the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Currie, C. J.
Yes, evidence of a defendant's threats, physical force, and explicit statements of intent to have sexual intercourse, followed by desistance only after the victim reveals her pregnancy, constitutes sufficient proof of attempted rape, as the victim's pregnancy is considered an "extraneous factor" preventing the completion of the crime. The court found that the defendant's overt acts—threatening to kill Randen, forcing her into the shack, and stating his intent while unzipping his pants and pulling up her skirt—were sufficient for a jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit rape by force. The defendant's desistance occurred only as a result of Randen’s plea of pregnancy. Citing State v. Damms, which held that the impossibility of a loaded gun was an "extraneous factor" under Wis. Stat. § 939.32(2), the court reasoned that Randen's pregnancy, though intrinsic to her, was a fortuitous circumstance unknown to the defendant that prevented the completion of the crime. Therefore, it qualified as an "extraneous factor." The court distinguished Oakley v. State by emphasizing the significant difference in the nature of the overt acts demonstrating intent, noting that Oakley involved less physical violence and threats. Regarding the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court concluded that trial counsel’s decision to pursue an insanity defense and introduce the defendant’s prior criminal and mental health record, despite its prejudicial nature, was a reasonable tactical choice given the strong identification evidence and weak alibi. Such representation did not fall below the standard of being "so inadequate and of such low competency as to amount to no representation" to warrant a new trial.
Concurring - Gordon, J.
Yes, the court's holding that there was sufficient evidence for attempted rape is correct. However, the attempt by the majority opinion to distinguish Oakley v. State is erroneous. Justice Gordon argued that the defendant's conduct in Oakley was just as "aggressive and offensive" and "unmistakably evidenced an intent to rape" as Le Barron's actions. He noted that in Oakley, the defendant persisted in his demands for sexual intercourse even after verifying the victim was menstruating, ultimately failing to complete the act. He asserted that such desistance should not relieve the defendant of the onus of prior criminal conduct or be used to distinguish his intentions from Le Barron's. Justice Gordon concluded that the instant case dramatically demonstrated the erroneousness of the holding in Oakley. Justice Hallows joined in this concurring opinion.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the interpretation of "extraneous factor" in attempted crimes, establishing that factors intrinsic to the victim or unknown to the perpetrator can prevent the completion of a crime while still supporting an attempt conviction. It reinforces the principle that intent, unequivocally demonstrated by overt acts, is key, and desistance due to an unforeseen circumstance does not negate prior intent. Furthermore, the ruling provides a high bar for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, emphasizing judicial deference to tactical decisions made in challenging circumstances and requiring representation to be "so inadequate...as to amount to no representation" to warrant a new trial.
