Lawrence v. Anderson
108 Vt. 176, 184 A. 689, 1936 Vt. LEXIS 170 (1936)
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Rule of Law:
An oral promise to pay for services rendered to a third party is considered a collateral promise to answer for the debt of another, and is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, if the service provider extends any credit to the person who received the services.
Facts:
- John Anderson suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident on October 1, 1933.
- The plaintiff, a physician, arrived at the scene and was met by the defendant, Anderson's daughter.
- A witness testified that the defendant told the plaintiff, "I want my father taken care of, and give him the best care you can give him, and what the charges are...I will pay for it."
- The plaintiff treated Anderson at the scene and later at a hospital.
- The plaintiff made his original charges for his services to John Anderson.
- The plaintiff sent bills to Anderson's estate and engaged a lawyer to attempt collection from the estate.
- About a year after the accident, the plaintiff began sending bills to Anderson's widow.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff physician sued the defendant, the patient's daughter, in the Chittenden municipal court (trial court).
- The case was tried before a jury.
- At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict.
- The trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.
- The plaintiff (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment.
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Issue:
Is a third party's oral promise to pay for medical services rendered to another person enforceable by the service provider if that provider subsequently makes the original charges to and attempts to collect from the patient?
Opinions:
Majority - Powers, C. J.
No. A third party's oral promise to pay for medical services is not enforceable if the provider extends credit to the patient. Even if the defendant's statement could be interpreted as a primary, original promise to pay, the plaintiff's subsequent conduct determines the nature of that promise for legal purposes. The plaintiff was at liberty to rely solely on the defendant's promise, but he could not hold both the patient (Anderson) and the defendant liable on an oral promise. By making the original charges against Anderson and attempting to collect from his estate, the plaintiff extended credit to Anderson. This action elected to treat the defendant's promise as collateral to Anderson's primary debt. A collateral promise to pay the debt of another falls within the Statute of Frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable. Since the promise was oral and the plaintiff treated Anderson as the primary debtor, the defendant cannot be held liable.
Analysis:
This decision illustrates a critical application of the Statute of Frauds, particularly the distinction between a primary and a collateral promise. The court establishes that a creditor's post-promise conduct, such as billing practices, is strong evidence in determining to whom credit was extended. This creates a significant precedent for future cases by showing that a creditor's actions can retroactively define the legal character of an oral promise. It solidifies the principle that a party cannot treat an oral promise as an enforceable primary obligation while simultaneously pursuing payment from the person who directly received the services, forcing creditors to make a clear choice at the outset.
