Lawn v. United States
1958 U.S. LEXIS 1859, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)
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Rule of Law:
An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, if valid on its face, is sufficient to call for a trial on the merits and is not subject to challenge on the ground that it was based on inadequate or incompetent evidence.
Facts:
- Petitioners Giglio, Livorsi, and Lawn operated several partnerships and corporations to engage in a World War II black market sugar business.
- They were alleged to have conspired to evade over $800,000 in federal income taxes for the year 1946.
- The scheme involved creating shell corporations to siphon off profits through fraudulent invoices and concealing personal assets.
- In July 1952, the petitioners were subpoenaed to testify and produce records before a federal grand jury.
- During this 1952 proceeding, they were not warned of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
- Lawn, a lawyer for the enterprise, produced canceled checks and a corresponding check stub, which the U.S. Attorney photostated before returning them.
- Giglio produced a quantity of partnership and corporate records.
- Lawn was instrumental in creating the shell corporations and advised Giglio on transferring personal property to another individual to conceal it from the government.
Procedural Posture:
- In October 1952, a grand jury returned indictments against the petitioners for tax evasion.
- Petitioners moved to dismiss the 1952 indictments, arguing their Fifth Amendment rights were violated because they were compelled to testify without being warned of their right against self-incrimination.
- The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion and dismissed the 1952 indictments.
- While the government's appeal of the dismissal was pending, a second grand jury, before which petitioners did not appear, returned a new indictment in July 1953.
- The government's appeal of the first dismissal was subsequently dismissed as untimely.
- Petitioners moved to dismiss the 1953 indictment and requested a hearing to determine if it was procured using illegally obtained evidence from the 1952 proceeding.
- The District Court denied the motion for a hearing and the motion to dismiss the indictment.
- Following a jury trial, the petitioners were convicted on multiple counts.
- The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment require a district court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine if a grand jury indictment, valid on its face, was based on evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in a prior, separate grand jury proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Whittaker
No. The Fifth Amendment does not require a preliminary hearing to challenge a facially valid indictment from a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury based on suspicions that it was procured with incompetent evidence. Relying on Costello v. United States, the Court reasoned that allowing defendants to challenge indictments on such grounds would lead to interminable delays and preliminary trials, undermining the grand jury's function. The Fifth Amendment's requirement is satisfied by an indictment that is valid on its face, and defendants are protected from the use of illegal evidence at the trial on the merits. Here, the petitioners' request for a hearing was based on unsupported suspicion, not a solid claim of illegality. Regarding a photostat of a check obtained in the first proceeding and used at trial, the Court found that defense counsel consciously and intentionally waived any objection by stating 'no objection' after using the exhibit to his advantage during a voir dire examination of a witness.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Harlan
No, but the conviction of Lawn should be re-examined. While agreeing with the majority that a preliminary hearing on the indictment was not required, the dissent argues that the Court erred in finding a 'conscious and intentional waiver' regarding the admission of the tainted photostatic copy of the check. The dissent finds it unconvincing that defense counsel deliberately waived the objection, suggesting it is equally likely that counsel, like the prosecutor and the judge, simply failed to notice the exhibit's illicit origin. Given the government's repeated promises not to use tainted evidence, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt. The proper remedy would be to remand Lawn's case to the district court to determine if the prosecutor had access to 'innocent' (independently sourced) copies of the documents at the time of trial, which would render the error harmless; otherwise, a new trial should be granted.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the principle from Costello v. United States, establishing that a grand jury indictment is largely insulated from pre-trial evidentiary challenges. It prioritizes judicial efficiency and the 'rigorous administration of justice' over defendants' attempts to conduct 'mini-trials' into the grand jury process based on mere suspicion. The case solidifies the indictment's role as a charging instrument, not a final adjudication, shifting the focus of evidentiary battles to the trial itself. Furthermore, the ruling on waiver serves as a significant cautionary tale for defense attorneys, illustrating that an affirmative 'no objection' can forfeit even a potent Fifth Amendment claim, particularly when counsel makes tactical use of the evidence in question.
