Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz.
755 P.2d 1135, 157 Ariz. 147, 1988 Ariz. LEXIS 73 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
Under Arizona's comparative fault statute, a plaintiff's unreasonable failure to use an available seat belt may constitute 'fault,' allowing a jury to reduce the plaintiff's damages for injuries that were caused or enhanced by the nonuse.
Facts:
- On November 8, 1985, Cindy Law was driving her parents’ car in Tempe, Arizona.
- Law pulled her vehicle in front of an automobile operated by James Harder.
- To avoid a collision, Harder swerved violently, which caused his vehicle to overturn.
- James Harder and his wife, who were passengers in his car, were not wearing their seat belts.
- The Harders were thrown from their car as it overturned.
- As a result of the accident, the Harders suffered severe orthopedic injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- James and his wife Harder (plaintiffs) filed a negligence action against Cindy Law and her parents (defendants) in an Arizona trial court.
- During discovery, defendants sought information regarding the Harders' nonuse of seat belts.
- The trial judge granted the Harders' motion for a protective order, precluding discovery on the issue based on the precedent set in Nash v. Kamrath.
- Defendants filed a special action petition with the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction, vacated the trial court’s protective order, and held that evidence of seat belt nonuse was admissible to mitigate damages.
- The Harders (plaintiffs) petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court (the state's highest court) for review of the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's failure to wear an available and operational seat belt constitute 'fault' under Arizona's comparative negligence statute, thereby allowing the jury to consider this nonuse to reduce the damages awarded for injuries caused or enhanced by it?
Opinions:
Majority - Feldman, Vice Chief Justice.
Yes, a plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt is a factor the jury may consider to reduce damages under the theory of comparative fault. The prior rule from Nash v. Kamrath, which held seat belt nonuse irrelevant, is no longer valid due to changes in law and technology. The court rejects Nash's premises that one need not anticipate the negligence of others, that seat belts may be dangerous, and that there is no duty to wear one. Given the foreseeability of accidents and the proven safety of seat belts, each person has an obligation to act reasonably to minimize foreseeable injuries. This obligation falls under Arizona’s comparative negligence statute (A.R.S. § 12-2505), which reduces a plaintiff's damages in proportion to their 'fault.' The court interprets 'fault' to include the unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or mitigate damages, which encompasses the pre-accident conduct of not wearing a seat belt. Adopting this 'seat belt defense' is a proper evolution of the common law and does not usurp the legislature's role.
Dissenting - Holohan, Justice.
No, the court should not judicially create a 'seat belt defense.' The majority's reliance on comparative negligence principles is misplaced, as Arizona's statute ties comparative negligence to conduct that causes the accident (contributory negligence), which seat belt nonuse rarely does. The appropriate legal doctrine, if any, would be 'avoidable consequences,' which relates to damages, not liability or 'fault.' More importantly, creating a duty to wear a seat belt is a significant public policy decision that should be made by the legislature, not the judiciary. The court is engaging in judicial lawmaking and, by applying this new rule retroactively to the plaintiffs, is acting in a grossly unfair manner, as they acted at a time when clear precedent held that seat belt nonuse had no legal consequences.
Majority - Feldman, Vice Chief Justice.
(Supplemental Opinion on Reconsideration) While reaffirming its primary holding that the seat belt defense is valid in Arizona, the court modifies its decision to have prospective application only. The court agrees with the dissent's reasoning that applying the new rule retroactively would produce substantially inequitable results, as it overrules clear and reliable precedent (Nash) upon which the public could have relied. Therefore, the holding recognizing the seat belt defense will apply only to accidents occurring after the date the court's mandate is filed. For the Harders, the defendants in the instant case, evidence of their seat belt nonuse remains inadmissible.
Concurring - Holohan, Justice.
Yes. (Concurring in the result of the supplemental opinion only).
Analysis:
This case marks a significant shift in Arizona tort law by establishing the 'seat belt defense' and overturning the long-standing precedent of Nash v. Kamrath. The decision aligns Arizona with a growing number of jurisdictions that hold plaintiffs responsible for mitigating their own damages by taking reasonable pre-accident safety precautions. By interpreting 'fault' under the comparative negligence statute to include nonuse of a seat belt, the court modernized its tort law to reflect technological realities and the principles of personal responsibility. The supplemental opinion's crucial holding that the new rule applies only prospectively demonstrates the judiciary's struggle to balance the evolution of common law with the need for fairness and predictability for litigants who acted under the old rule.
