Lauritzen v. Lauritzen
1994 Wash. App. LEXIS 241, 74 Wash. App. 432, 874 P.2d 861 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The driver of a private passenger vehicle does not have a 'special relationship' with a passenger that gives rise to a legal duty to protect that passenger from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. The general rule that a private person has no duty to protect others from third-party criminal acts applies.
Facts:
- Christine and Bret Lauritzen were vacationing in Miami, Florida.
- They had received multiple warnings from friends, a hotel pamphlet, and a store employee about the dangers of certain areas in Miami, particularly after dark.
- A parking attendant provided Bret with simple directions to the freeway, but Bret chose to ignore them, stating he was taking the 'scenic route'.
- Bret and Christine became lost for approximately an hour, driving into what Christine described as 'a very ugly part of town'.
- During this time, Bret grew angry, refused Christine's suggestions to ask for directions at a nearby police station, and would not let her look at the map.
- Bret eventually pulled into the parking lot of a convenience store to examine the map.
- While the vehicle was parked, an unknown assailant smashed the passenger-side window with a rock, grabbed a bag from the car, and fled.
- Christine was injured by flying glass from the shattered window during the attack.
Procedural Posture:
- Christine Lauritzen filed a negligence complaint against Bret Lauritzen in Pierce County Superior Court, a trial court.
- Bret Lauritzen moved for summary judgment, arguing he owed no legal duty to protect his wife from the criminal acts of a third party.
- The trial court granted Bret's motion for summary judgment, concluding that no legal duty existed under the circumstances.
- Christine Lauritzen, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the Court of Appeals of Washington, an intermediate appellate court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the driver of a private vehicle owe a legal duty to protect a passenger from the foreseeable criminal acts of a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Alexander, J.
No, the driver of a private vehicle does not owe a legal duty to protect a passenger from the foreseeable criminal acts of a third party. The general common law rule is that a person has no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third parties. An exception exists where a 'special relationship' between the parties creates such a duty. The court declined to recognize the driver-passenger relationship as a 'special relationship' under Washington law. It distinguished this relationship from recognized special relationships (e.g., innkeeper-guest, common carrier-passenger, employer-employee) by noting that those relationships typically involve entrustment, control over the premises where the harm occurs, a financial benefit, and a historic duty to render aid. A driver of a private vehicle does not have control over public streets, does not typically benefit financially, and has no historic duty to protect a passenger from crime. To impose such a duty would be an unreasonable expansion of tort liability, potentially making drivers insurers for simply traveling in high-crime areas.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the narrow application of the 'special relationship' exception in tort law, which imposes an affirmative duty to protect others from third-party harm. The court's refusal to extend this duty to the non-commercial driver-passenger relationship signals a reluctance to expand liability for omissions, particularly outside of contexts involving control over premises or a commercial benefit. This holding makes it significantly more difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in a negligence claim against a private individual for failing to prevent a criminal act by a stranger. The case solidifies the principle that foreseeability of harm alone does not create a duty of care without a qualifying special relationship.
