Lauderdale v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
90 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,073, 512 F.3d 157, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29753 (2007)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Actionable sexual harassment under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires conduct that is either severe or pervasive, with frequency diminishing the required severity; an employer may assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense if they exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and the employee unreasonably failed to use available reporting mechanisms, including pursuing additional avenues after an initial report proves ineffective; and qualified immunity does not protect objectively offensive sexual harassment that is actionable.
Facts:
- On June 3, 2004, Debra Lauderdale began working as a correctional officer for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).
- After five weeks of training and two weeks of on-the-job training, Lauderdale met Rodrick Arthur, who became her ultimate supervisor as the acting warden on the night shift.
- In late July, Arthur began calling Lauderdale multiple times (eventually 10-15 times per shift) during her night shifts, asking her for coffee, telling her she was beautiful and he loved her, and suggesting they go to Las Vegas to 'snuggle.'
- Lauderdale told her immediate supervisor, Sergeant Kroll, about Arthur's phone calls, and Kroll advised her to speak to the warden but not to mention Kroll's name.
- In August, Arthur showed up at Lauderdale's building saying he missed her and invited her to sit in the warden's office during breaks, which she refused.
- In mid-October, Arthur grabbed Lauderdale's handcuff case from her back, pulling her to himself such that her lower back touched his stomach, before she jerked away.
- On October 25, Arthur sent for Lauderdale, but she believed he had no legitimate reason and refused to report, subsequently not returning to work.
- On December 3, Lauderdale officially resigned, citing 'Dissatisfaction with supervisors or coworkers,' and filed a formal EEO complaint against Arthur for sexual harassment.
Procedural Posture:
- Debra Lauderdale initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and against Rodrick D. Arthur under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging sexual harassment.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both the TDCJ and Rodrick Arthur, concluding that Arthur's alleged behavior was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, and further, that Arthur was entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Is a supervisor's pervasive but not individually severe sexually harassing behavior sufficient to create an actionable hostile work environment claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983? 2. Can an employer successfully assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense against a Title VII hostile work environment claim when the employee reports harassment to an immediate supervisor but fails to utilize other provided reporting avenues after that initial report proves ineffective? 3. Is a supervisor entitled to qualified immunity for sexually harassing behavior that is deemed objectively offensive and actionable under Title VII and § 1983?
Opinions:
Majority - Jerry E. Smith
1. Yes, a supervisor's pervasive but not individually severe sexually harassing behavior is sufficient to create an actionable hostile work environment claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court disagreed with the district court's finding that Arthur’s behavior was not severe or pervasive enough. The "severe or pervasive" test is disjunctive, meaning that frequent incidents of harassment, even if not individually severe, can still amount to a hostile work environment. Given Lauderdale's allegations of Arthur calling her 10-15 times a night for almost four months, inviting her to "snuggle" in Las Vegas, and physically pulling her to him, the court found his behavior pervasive, thereby diminishing the level of severity required to establish an altered work environment. This pervasive conduct satisfied the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim. 2. No, an employer cannot successfully assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense against a Title VII hostile work environment claim when the employee reports harassment to an immediate supervisor but fails to utilize other provided reporting avenues after that initial report proves ineffective. The court held that the TDCJ successfully asserted the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. It was undisputed that no tangible employment action resulted from Arthur's behavior. The TDCJ satisfied the first prong of the defense by having clear sexual harassment policies and training programs, which Lauderdale had received. Regarding the second prong, Lauderdale's failure to pursue other reporting avenues listed in the TDCJ policy after Sergeant Kroll explicitly indicated his unwillingness to act was unreasonable, consistent with Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co.. Furthermore, her formal complaint filed on the day she resigned was deemed insufficient to defeat the defense as it did not allow the employer to remediate the situation or mitigate damages. 3. No, a supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity for sexually harassing behavior that is deemed objectively offensive and actionable under Title VII and § 1983. The court determined that Arthur was not entitled to qualified immunity. The right to be free from sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment is a clearly established right. Actionable sexual harassment, by definition, must be "objectively offensive." Since qualified immunity protects only "objectively reasonable" conduct, and objectively offensive behavior cannot be objectively reasonable, qualified immunity is inapplicable when sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII or § 1983.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the "severe or pervasive" standard for hostile work environment claims, emphasizing that pervasiveness can compensate for lesser individual severity, providing a crucial avenue for plaintiffs experiencing frequent but less egregious harassment. It robustly reinforces the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense by imposing a strict requirement on employees to utilize all available internal reporting mechanisms, especially if initial complaints are ineffective, and deems belated complaints at resignation insufficient. Furthermore, the ruling creates a strong precedent that qualified immunity cannot shield government supervisors from liability for objectively offensive, actionable sexual harassment under § 1983, effectively removing a common defense in such cases.
