Laubach v. Morgan
588 P.2d 1071 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
In a comparative negligence action with multiple defendants, a plaintiff's negligence is compared to the aggregate negligence of all defendants to determine if recovery is permitted. If recovery is allowed, each defendant is severally liable only for their apportioned percentage of the damages, as the doctrine of joint and several liability is abrogated in this context.
Facts:
- Laubach, Morgan, and Martin were involved in a three-car collision.
- Laubach sustained damages as a result of the single, indivisible accident.
- The actions of all three parties—Laubach, Martin, and Morgan—were contributing causes to the collision and Laubach's resulting damages.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Laubach sued defendants Morgan and Martin in an Oklahoma trial court for damages arising from a three-car collision.
- Defendant Martin filed a cross-petition against defendant Morgan.
- The case was tried to a jury, which apportioned negligence as follows: Laubach (30%), Martin (50%), and Morgan (20%).
- The jury determined Laubach's total damages to be $4,000.00.
- The trial court entered a judgment for Laubach against both Morgan and Martin for a total of $2,800.00 ($4,000.00 less Laubach's 30% fault), holding them jointly and severally liable.
- Defendant Morgan, the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
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Issue:
Under Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute, is a plaintiff's percentage of negligence compared to the aggregate percentage of negligence of all defendants combined, and are those defendants severally liable only for their apportioned share of the damages rather than jointly and severally liable?
Opinions:
Majority - Doolin, Justice
Yes. In an action based on comparative negligence, a plaintiff's percentage of negligence is to be compared with the aggregate negligence of all defendants combined, and each defendant is only severally liable for their apportioned share of the damages. First, the court holds that Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute, adopted from Arkansas, should be interpreted consistent with Arkansas precedent, specifically Walton v. Tull. This precedent established that a plaintiff's negligence should be compared to the combined negligence of all defendants. This approach prevents the unfair result where a plaintiff's ability to recover diminishes simply because there are more tortfeasors, aligning with the legislative intent to allow recovery so long as the plaintiff's negligence is less than 50 percent of the cause. Second, the court abrogates the common law doctrine of joint and several liability in comparative negligence cases. It reasons that holding a defendant who is only minimally at fault liable for the entire judgment is fundamentally inconsistent with the core principle of comparative negligence, which is to attach liability in direct proportion to fault. By making each defendant severally liable for their percentage of fault, the system becomes more equitable and eliminates the need for contribution actions between defendants.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally reshaped Oklahoma tort law by judicially interpreting the state's ambiguous comparative negligence statute. By adopting the 'aggregate' rule for comparing negligence, the court made it easier for plaintiffs to recover in multi-defendant cases. More significantly, the court's abrogation of joint and several liability in this context marked a major departure from common law tradition. This shifted the risk of an insolvent or judgment-proof defendant from the other co-defendants to the plaintiff, prioritizing proportional fault over ensuring the plaintiff's full recovery from any single defendant. The ruling established a clear framework for apportioning liability based strictly on fault, influencing how multi-party tort litigation is approached and settled in the state.
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