Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc.
261 P.3d 1215, 351 Or. 1, 2011 Ore. LEXIS 714 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of a co-defendant's intoxication is not relevant to determining factual causation under the 'substantial factor' test, which concerns only the physical effect of conduct. However, such evidence is relevant to the apportionment of fault between defendants because apportionment is based on the relative blameworthiness of each party's conduct.
Facts:
- A truck owned by Combined Transport, Inc. spilled its load of large glass panes onto the I-5 freeway.
- The spill created a significant traffic backup on the freeway.
- The decedent was stopped in his pickup truck in the backed-up traffic caused by the spill.
- Judy Clemmer, who was intoxicated, was driving her vehicle and collided with the decedent's stopped pickup truck.
- The collision ruptured the pickup truck's fuel system, causing fuel to leak.
- The leaking fuel ignited, and the resulting fire killed the decedent.
Procedural Posture:
- The decedent's father sued Combined Transport, Inc. and Judy Clemmer in an Oregon circuit court (trial court) for negligence.
- In her answer, Clemmer admitted that she was negligent and that her negligence was a cause of the decedent's death.
- The plaintiff moved in limine to exclude evidence of Clemmer's intoxication, which the trial court granted.
- A jury found Combined Transport 22% at fault and Clemmer 78% at fault for the plaintiff's damages.
- Combined Transport, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court erred by excluding evidence of Clemmer's intoxication.
- The plaintiff, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of Oregon.
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Issue:
In a multi-defendant negligence action where one defendant has admitted negligence and causation, is evidence of that defendant's intoxication relevant to determining (1) whether the other defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm, and (2) the proper apportionment of fault between the defendants?
Opinions:
Majority - Walters, J.
No as to causation; Yes as to apportionment of fault. Evidence of a defendant's intoxication is not relevant to the factual cause analysis concerning a co-defendant but is relevant to apportioning fault between them. The court reasoned that factual causation, under the 'substantial factor' test, is a purely physical inquiry into the effect of a defendant's conduct, not their state of mind or the blameworthiness of their actions. Clemmer's intoxication did not alter the physical effect of her collision or make Combined Transport's spill less of a substantial factor in causing the decedent to be stopped on the freeway. Conversely, intoxication is highly relevant to apportioning fault because that analysis requires the jury to compare the relative blameworthiness of each defendant and the degree to which they deviated from the standard of care. Furthermore, the court held that a defendant seeking to introduce a co-defendant's unpleaded negligence must plead it as an affirmative defense, but construed Combined Transport's improper cross-claim as such a defense due to the unique circumstances of the case.
Dissenting - De Muniz, C. J.
No. The evidence of intoxication was properly excluded because of Combined Transport's failure to properly plead it as an affirmative defense. The majority errs by rewriting a deficient and properly stricken pleading to excuse a defendant's procedural failure. Oregon pleading rules have long and clearly required a defendant to plead an affirmative defense to introduce evidence not raised by the plaintiff. A cross-claim for contribution is a distinct procedural tool that was correctly stricken by the trial court as premature. The majority’s decision to construe the stricken cross-claim as an affirmative defense under ORCP 12 is an improper application of that rule, which is not intended to correct a complete failure to plead. The trial court did not err, and its judgment should have been affirmed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between factual causation and apportionment of fault in Oregon tort law. It establishes that causation is a purely physical inquiry, separate from a party's blameworthiness, thus preventing defendants from using a co-defendant's egregious conduct (like intoxication) to argue their own actions were not a factual cause of the harm. The decision's most significant impact is procedural, creating a bright-line rule that defendants must affirmatively plead a co-defendant's specific, unpleaded acts of negligence if they want to use that evidence to reduce their own share of fault. This holding reinforces that pleadings define the scope of litigation and prevents unfair surprise at trial.
