Lasalle v. Vogel
248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263, 36 Cal. App. 5th 127 (2019)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
California Code of Civil Procedure § 583.130 imposes a legal duty on all parties to cooperate in bringing an action to trial, which includes an ethical and legal obligation for a plaintiff's counsel to provide reasonable and reliable warning to opposing counsel before requesting a default.
Facts:
- From 2011 to 2015, attorney Joanna T. Vogel represented Angele Lasalle in the dissolution of a domestic partnership.
- In that case, Lasalle was defaulted as a sanction for repeatedly failing to provide discovery.
- Lasalle then sued Vogel for legal malpractice, alleging Vogel's failure to keep her informed caused the default.
- Vogel was served with the malpractice complaint on March 3, 2016.
- On April 7, 2016, 35 days after service, Lasalle's attorney sent Vogel a letter and an email demanding a responsive pleading by the close of business the next day, April 8.
- At the time, Vogel was a single mother dealing with her own divorce and had just discovered her ex-husband had defaulted on property taxes and the mortgage on her home.
- Having received no response, Lasalle's attorney requested and obtained an entry of default against Vogel on the afternoon of Monday, April 11.
- Vogel emailed a request for an extension less than 90 minutes after the default was entered.
Procedural Posture:
- Angele Lasalle filed a legal malpractice action against her former attorney, Joanna Vogel, in the superior court (trial court).
- After Vogel failed to file a timely responsive pleading, Lasalle's counsel requested and the court clerk entered a default against Vogel.
- Vogel filed a motion to set aside the default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), claiming excusable neglect.
- The trial court denied Vogel's motion to set aside the default.
- Subsequently, the trial court entered a default judgment of $1 million against Vogel.
- Vogel appealed to the California Court of Appeal from both the judgment and the order denying her motion to set aside the default.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by denying a motion to set aside a default when the plaintiff's attorney requests the default after providing an unreasonably short deadline via an unreliable method of notice, contrary to the statutory policy requiring parties to cooperate?
Opinions:
Majority - Bedsworth, Acting P. J.
Yes, a trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion to set aside a default under these circumstances. The statutory policy codified in Code of Civil Procedure § 583.130, which requires parties to cooperate, elevates the ethical obligation to warn opposing counsel before taking a default into a legal one. The court found that Lasalle's counsel's conduct—using unreliable email for notice, providing an unreasonably short one-day deadline, and acting with 'quiet speed'—was contrary to this statutory duty of cooperation. The court's analysis weighed several factors: (1) the unreliability of email for such a critical notice; (2) the unreasonably short deadline; (3) the lack of prejudice to Lasalle if the default were set aside; (4) the complex, 'trial-within-a-trial' nature of the malpractice case, which is unsuited for default; (5) Vogel's meritorious defense to the emotional distress damages; (6) the trial court's improper consideration of Vogel's prior disciplinary history; and (7) Vogel's personal circumstances, which constituted excusable neglect. The court emphasized that the law strongly favors resolving cases on their merits, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of granting relief from default.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the ethical concept of professional courtesy into a legally enforceable duty under California Code of Civil Procedure § 583.130. It puts attorneys on notice that 'gotcha' litigation tactics, such as racing to the courthouse to enter a default without providing reasonable warning, are contrary to state policy and may constitute grounds for reversal. The opinion signals that appellate courts will scrutinize denials of set-aside motions more carefully when there is evidence of incivility or a failure to cooperate. This precedent strengthens the hand of defendants seeking relief from default and discourages plaintiffs from using procedural deadlines as a weapon rather than a case management tool.
