Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
459 U.S. 116, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 170, 74 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that vests in religious institutions the unilateral and standardless discretionary power to veto liquor license applications violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Facts:
- Grendel's Den, Inc. operated a restaurant in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- The Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish, a church, was located adjacent to the restaurant, with their back walls only 10 feet apart.
- A Massachusetts statute, § 16C, provided that premises within 500 feet of a church or school could not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of the church or school filed a written objection.
- In 1977, Grendel's Den applied for an alcoholic beverages license.
- The Holy Cross Church filed a written objection to Grendel's Den's application, expressing concern over the proximity of liquor establishments.
Procedural Posture:
- The Cambridge License Commission denied Grendel's Den's license application, citing only the church's objection.
- The Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission upheld the denial on appeal.
- Grendel's Den sued the commissions in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Grendel's Den, holding the statute facially unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
- A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit initially reversed the District Court's decision.
- The First Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and subsequently affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding an Establishment Clause violation.
- The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that grants churches the absolute power to veto liquor license applications for establishments within a 500-foot radius violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
Yes. A state statute that delegates discretionary governmental power to a religious institution violates the Establishment Clause. The statute fails the Lemon test because it has a primary effect of advancing religion and fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion. By giving churches a standardless veto power, the law substitutes the unilateral decision of a religious body for the reasoned decision-making of a public authority, creating a 'fusion of governmental and religious functions.' This enmeshes churches in the processes of government and provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion. While the state has a valid secular purpose in protecting churches from the disruption of nearby liquor establishments, this purpose can be achieved through less constitutionally problematic means, such as an absolute ban or allowing churches to voice their opinions at a public hearing.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Massachusetts statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court mischaracterizes a sensible zoning law as a 'veto' and creates bad law from a 'silly case.' An absolute legislative ban on liquor sales near churches would be constitutional, and this statute is merely a less restrictive, more flexible version of such a ban that allows the affected church to waive the protection. The statute does not sponsor or subsidize religion, and to say it 'advances' religion is a strain of the word. The law's purpose is to protect those engaged in religious and educational activities from incompatible uses of neighboring property, a goal that is not improperly 'religious' but a valid exercise of state power.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial precedent that the government cannot delegate its discretionary powers, such as licensing and zoning authority, to religious institutions. It reinforces the 'entanglement' prong of the Lemon test, clarifying that entanglement occurs not only when government supervises religion, but also when religious entities are given direct power over governmental processes. The ruling limits the ability of states to create special zones of protection around churches that give the churches themselves the ultimate, standardless authority to enforce that protection, thereby preventing a fusion of church and state functions.
