Lang v. Silva
715 N.E.2d 708, 306 Ill. App. 3d 960, 240 Ill. Dec. 21 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Voluntary participants in contact sports are liable for injuries to co-participants only for willful and wanton or intentional misconduct, not ordinary negligence, with the determination of whether a sport is 'contact' resting on whether physical contact is inherently inevitable. An employer is generally not vicariously liable for the acts of an independent contractor, distinguished primarily by the lack of control over the manner and method of work.
Facts:
- On February 19, 1992, during the seventh race at Sportsman’s Park racetrack, jockey Danny Lang (Lang) fell and sustained injuries.
- Lang's fall occurred when his horse came into contact with the horse ridden by Carlos Silva (Silva).
- Silva was cited for careless riding, disqualified from the race, and suspended for five days.
- Lang, having ridden in approximately 10,000 races, averred in an affidavit that physical contact between horses and riders during a race rarely occurred unless a rider failed to control the horse and was not inherent or inevitable.
- Several other jockeys, trainers, and racing stewards, through affidavits and depositions, stated that contact between horses, including bumping and clipping heels, occurred in nearly every race or was a common occurrence.
- Silva was self-employed, arranged races through an agent, rode on a per-race basis for various owners, provided his own saddle, and was paid by the racetrack, not directly by Crown’s Way Farm, Inc., Ronald Dicicilia, or Gene Cilio.
- Trainers like Cilio provided jockeys with general information about the horse before a race, but jockeys exercised their own judgment on how to run the race.
- Silva had 12 racing violations for careless riding over a 15-year period and approximately 10,000 races, a record that industry professionals considered better than average.
Procedural Posture:
- On February 18, 1994, Danny Lang and his wife, Linda Lang, filed an amended complaint against Carlos Silva, Crown’s Way Farm, Inc., Ronald Dicicilia, and Gene Cilio in trial court, alleging negligence, willful and wanton conduct, negligent/willful and wanton entrustment, and loss of consortium.
- On September 6, 1994, Silva filed a Section 2-615 motion to dismiss counts I (negligence) and III (willful and wanton conduct).
- The trial court granted Silva's Section 2-615 motion in part, dismissing counts I and III but allowing the plaintiffs leave to replead.
- On August 7, 1995, the plaintiffs filed their “Second Amended Counts I-IV” against all defendants.
- Defendants then filed Section 2-615 motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, arguing the contact sport exception and insufficient allegations for willful and wanton misconduct.
- On August 28, 1996, the trial court denied the Section 2-615 motions, suggesting a Section 2-619 motion would be more appropriate for considering factual material.
- Thereafter, all defendants filed a joint Section 2-619 motion to dismiss counts I and II (negligence and related loss of consortium) of the second amended complaint.
- On November 5, 1997, the trial court granted the Section 2-619 motion, dismissing counts I and II as to all defendants, finding that horse racing is a contact sport.
- On December 12, 1997, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding for immediate appeal of the November 5 order.
- On January 23, 1998, Crown’s Way, Dicicilia, and Cilio filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts III and IV (willful and wanton conduct, entrustment, and related loss of consortium).
- On April 23, 1998, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding Silva was an independent contractor as a matter of law and that the entrustment claims were unsupported by evidence. The trial court also made a Rule 304(a) finding, allowing immediate appeal of both rulings.
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Issue:
Does the contact sport exception to negligence liability apply to professional horse racing, and are horse owners and trainers vicariously liable for a jockey's misconduct, or is a jockey an independent contractor as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hoffman
No, the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence claims (counts I and II) by finding professional horse racing is a contact sport as a matter of law because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the frequency of contact. Illinois courts apply an exception to ordinary negligence for voluntary participants in 'contact sports,' holding them liable only for willful and wanton or intentional misconduct. The determination of what constitutes a contact sport hinges on whether physical contact is 'inevitable and inherent' or 'part and parcel' of the activity in reality, not merely if rules prohibit certain contact. While extensive evidence from defendants (jockeys, trainers, stewards) indicated frequent contact in nearly every race, Lang's affidavit contradicted this, stating contact was rare. This unattacked affidavit created a disputed issue of fact regarding the frequency of contact in professional horse racing, which, in light of a jury demand, should have been decided by a jury, not by the trial court on a Section 2-619 motion, despite the apparent weight of other evidence. Yes, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, finding that Silva was an independent contractor as a matter of law, precluding vicarious liability for Crown’s Way, Dicicilia, and Cilio, and also properly dismissed the negligent/willful and wanton entrustment claims. Generally, an employer is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. The key factor in distinguishing an independent contractor from an employee/agent is the right to control the manner and method of work. The evidence established Silva's independent contractor status: he hired an agent, rode on a per-race basis for various owners, provided his own equipment, was paid by the racetrack (not directly by owners), and received only general instructions from trainers, retaining professional judgment during races. This aligns with precedent from Clark v. Industrial Comm’n. Thus, as a matter of law, Silva was an independent contractor, removing the basis for vicarious liability for the horse owners/trainers for his conduct. Regarding entrustment, to prove negligent or willful and wanton entrustment, plaintiffs must show defendants knew or should have known Silva was likely to cause unreasonable harm. Despite Silva's 12 violations over 15 years, unrefuted testimony from industry professionals indicated he was a careful rider with a better-than-average record, meaning reasonable minds could not conclude the defendants should have foreseen a risk of harm. Therefore, summary judgment on the entrustment claims was also proper.
Analysis:
This case is significant for several reasons. It clarifies that the application of the 'contact sport' exception requires a factual determination of whether physical contact is routinely part of the sport, even if rules proscribe it, and highlights the procedural limitations of dismissing a case on summary judgment when a genuine factual dispute exists. The ruling also reinforces the 'right to control' as the predominant factor in determining independent contractor status, particularly in specialized fields like professional sports, making it challenging to hold horse owners/trainers vicariously liable for jockey misconduct. This distinction can significantly impact liability in sports-related injury cases.
