Landreth v. Melendez
948 S.W.2d 76, 1997 WL 359298 (1997)
Rule of Law:
An express reservation in a deed that grants mineral owners the right to use "all usual, necessary and convenient means" for mineral operations and absolves them from surface damage liability for such operations, overrides the general common law accommodation doctrine, thereby shifting the burden to the surface owner to prove the mineral owner's means were not usual, necessary, and convenient.
Facts:
- In 1947, J.P. and Matilda Nystel, owners of Section 9, Block C-38, PSL Survey, Terry County, executed an oil and gas lease that remained in force by continuing production.
- In 1950, the Nystels conveyed the surface of Section 9, expressly reserving all minerals and the right of ingress and egress for mineral operations using "all usual, necessary and convenient means," and explicitly stating there would be "no liability ... for damages to the surface estate" in connection with such operations.
- In February 1989, Cesáreo Melendez and Prisaliana Melendez purchased the South one-half of Section 9, subject to existing easements and reservations, specifically excepting all oil, gas, and other minerals.
- At the time of Melendez's purchase, two wells were situated on the southwest quarter of the land: an injection well (drilled in 1951) and a tank battery, and a producing oil well (Nystel 3-B, drilled in 1983) with a conventional "horse head" pump jack.
- Melendez grew irrigated cotton on the surface, using a shortened center-pivot system on the southwest quarter that did not reach the existing tank battery or Nystel 3-B well.
- In July 1993, Robert E. Landreth purchased the Nystel lease and portions of the underlying mineral estate, subsequently advising Melendez in April 1994 of his intention to drill additional wells.
- In April 1994, Melendez installed a quarter-section electric center-pivot irrigation system and requested Landreth make accommodations; Landreth subsequently constructed ramps for the system to pass over the Nystel 3-B well at his expense.
- In September 1995, Landreth informed Melendez of plans to drill two new wells, but after discussions, they were unable to reach an accord, and Landreth drilled and completed the Nystel 4-B and 5-B oil wells between November 1995 and January 1996, installing conventional pump jacks no higher than the Nystel 3-B well's pump jack.
Procedural Posture:
- Melendez initiated an action against Landreth in a trial court (bench trial), seeking damages and an injunction.
- The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against Landreth.
- The trial court subsequently issued a temporary injunction against Landreth.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment decreeing Melendez’s recovery of $5,000 from Landreth and permanently enjoining Landreth from interfering with Melendez’s irrigation system.
- Landreth (appellant) perfected an appeal to the appellate court, challenging the trial court’s judgment.
- The appellate court initially reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the cause on April 30, 1997.
- All parties filed motions for rehearing with the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does an unambiguous express reservation in a surface deed, granting mineral owners the right to use "all usual, necessary and convenient means" for mineral exploration and production without liability for surface damages, preclude the application of the common law accommodation doctrine, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the surface owner to demonstrate that the mineral owner's operations were not by "usual, necessary and convenient means"?
Opinions:
Majority - Reynolds, Senior Justice (Retired)
Yes, an unambiguous express reservation granting mineral owners the right to use "all usual, necessary and convenient means" for mineral operations without liability for surface damages precludes the application of the common law accommodation doctrine, thereby shifting the burden to the surface owner to prove the mineral owner's means were not usual, necessary, and convenient. The court determined that the Nystel reservation was unambiguous, clearly reserving to mineral owners the right to use "all usual, necessary and convenient means" and absolving them from liability for surface damages when such means are employed. When Melendez acquired the surface, they were on notice of this reservation and were bound by its terms, thereby limiting their rights. This reservation differentiates the situation from cases where implied rights necessitate the accommodation doctrine (e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621-22 (Tex.1971)). Instead, the mineral owners are under no obligation to accommodate surface owners' existing use as long as they employ "usual, necessary and convenient means." Therefore, the burden fell upon Melendez to establish that Landreth's production methods for the new wells were not by "all usual, necessary and convenient means." Melendez failed to discharge this burden, as evidence that low-profile pump units were used in only one percent of area wells indicated they were "uncommon, not usual," and Melendez did not negate the necessity of conventional pump jacks. Because the trial court did not make findings on whether Landreth used "all usual, necessary, and convenient means," the issue requires a decision by the trier of fact, necessitating a remand.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interplay between express contractual reservations and the common law accommodation doctrine in Texas oil and gas law. It emphasizes that explicit language in a deed can modify or supersede implied rights and duties that would otherwise arise under the accommodation doctrine. Future cases involving surface-mineral conflicts where an express reservation exists will likely focus on the interpretation of that reservation's language and whether the mineral owner's actions fall within its scope, rather than solely on the reasonableness of accommodation. It places a substantial burden on surface owners to prove that a mineral owner's actions were not "usual, necessary, and convenient" if such language is present in their chain of title.
