Lambertson v. United States
528 F.2d 441 (1976)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A claim against the United States government "arises out of a battery" and is thus barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act's intentional tort exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)) if the underlying action involves an intentional offensive contact, regardless of whether the government employee intended to cause actual harm.
Facts:
- The plaintiff was an employee of Armour & Co. working on a receiving dock.
- William Boslet, a meat inspector for the United States Department of Agriculture, was on duty at the same location.
- While the plaintiff was unloading a truck, Boslet suddenly and without warning jumped on his back.
- Boslet screamed "boo", pulled the plaintiff's stocking hat over his eyes, and began to ride him piggyback.
- As a result of Boslet's actions, the plaintiff fell forward and struck his face on nearby meat hooks.
- The plaintiff suffered severe injuries to his mouth and teeth.
- Immediately after the incident, Boslet apologized and stated he was only playing and meant no harm.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
- The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding it was barred by the battery exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
- The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a claim for personal injury resulting from a federal employee's intentional and offensive physical contact, which was intended as horseplay and not to cause harm, constitute a claim 'arising out of a battery' that is barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Van Graafeiland
Yes. The claim is one 'arising out of a battery' and is therefore barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act. In determining whether the § 2680(h) exception applies, the court must look to the substance of the claim, not the plaintiff's chosen legal theory, such as negligence. Under the FTCA, the law of the place where the act occurred (New York) defines the tort. New York law establishes that the essential element of battery is the intent to make contact, not the intent to cause injury. Because Boslet intentionally made contact with the plaintiff by jumping on his back, his actions constitute a battery. Allowing the plaintiff to re-characterize this battery as negligence would circumvent the clear intent of Congress to exclude such intentional torts from the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.
Concurring - Oakes
Yes. While a strong argument could be made that the battery exclusion in § 2680(h) should only apply when bodily harm is intended, not to cases of 'technical battery' like this one, the court is bound by precedent. The weight of authority, including in the Second Circuit, requires reading the intentional tort exclusions in their usual, legalistic sense. Under the common law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a battery includes an intentional offensive contact, even if it is not a harmful one. Therefore, existing case law compels the conclusion that the claim is barred.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that the intentional tort exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act are interpreted according to their traditional common law definitions. It establishes that courts will look past a plaintiff's labeling of a claim as 'negligence' to the substantive character of the government employee's conduct. The decision significantly narrows the path for recovery against the government in cases where an employee's prank or horseplay results in injury, as the intent to make contact is sufficient to classify the act as a battery, thereby triggering the FTCA's jurisdictional bar.
Unlock the full brief for Lambertson v. United States