No. A story from a dream isn't real evidence. The rules say a witness needs 'personal knowledge,' meaning they have to remember actually seeing or experiencing the event. Ladd didn't remember the crash itself, he only remembered his dream about the crash. The court said a memory of a dream is just speculation, not a real memory of an event, so it's not allowed in court. They also said since there were three different crashes, Ladd needed a doctor to explain which crash caused his specific brain injuries, and he didn't have one.

Yes, his story should be allowed. This judge thought the other judges were being too strict. He argued that maybe the dream helped Ladd 'unlock' his real memory of the crash. Since Ladd was actually there and now says he remembers it, a jury should get to hear his story and decide if they believe him. The judge shouldn't just throw the case out. He also thought it was obvious that getting hit by a semi-truck would cause new injuries, so a doctor wasn't needed to explain that.

Yes, the lower court made the right decision. Ladd's dream memory can't be used as evidence because it's not the same as actually remembering something that happened. The rules say that to testify about something, you need to have seen it yourself and remember it clearly. Ladd's brain injury means he couldn't remember what happened at the time, and a dream months later doesn't count as a real memory. Also, Ladd needed to have an expert explain his injuries because they were really complicated. He had brain injuries and there were three different accidents, so it's hard to know which accident caused which injury. Ladd's own description of his injuries isn't enough to prove which accident caused them. He needed a doctor or other expert to explain it. Ladd's regular doctors can't explain which accident caused which injury either, because they didn't see the accidents happen. They can only talk about treating Ladd, not about how he got hurt. To talk about how he got hurt, they would need to be called 'expert witnesses,' which Ladd didn't do. Because of these problems with Ladd's evidence, the court was right to decide in favor of the trucking company without a full trial.

No, the lower court made the wrong decision. Ladd clearly said in his testimony that he remembers being hit by the big truck. It's not totally clear how his dream relates to this memory, but if the dream helped him remember what happened, that should be okay. It should be up to a jury to decide if they believe Ladd's memory or not. Also, for some of Ladd's injuries, he might not need an expert to explain them. If Ladd can show he didn't have certain injuries after the first two accidents but did have them after the third accident with the big truck, it's pretty obvious that the third accident caused those injuries. Ladd should be allowed to testify about those injuries himself. The lower court should have let Ladd's case go forward and let a jury decide what to believe. It wasn't right to decide against Ladd without a full trial.

No. A plaintiff's testimony based exclusively on a dream does not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Utah Rule of Evidence 602. The rule requires that a witness must have perceived a relevant event and must be able to recall that perception. Here, Ladd's memory is not a recovered memory of the accident, but rather a memory of the dream itself. His admitted memory gap indicates he lacked the capacity to recall the event, and this gap cannot be filled by the contents of a dream experienced months later. Therefore, the testimony is inadmissible speculation. The court also affirmed that expert testimony was necessary to establish causation for Ladd's complex injuries, as a jury would have to speculate which of the three separate accidents caused which specific injuries.

Yes. The testimony should be admissible because Ladd now has a sworn memory of the incident, and its credibility is a question for the jury. The dissent argues that Ladd's testimony about the dream is ambiguous and could be interpreted as the process of his memory returning or as an event that refreshed his memory, not the sole source of it. Since anything can refresh a memory, Ladd's testimony establishes he was present and claims to remember the events, meeting the personal knowledge requirement. The ultimate reliability of that memory is a factual issue for the jury to weigh against competing evidence. The dissent also argues expert testimony on causation was not needed because Ladd could testify as to which injuries he had before versus after the semi-truck collision, making the causation of subsequent injuries obvious to a layperson.

Yes, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. Ladd's dream testimony does not qualify as admissible evidence under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because it does not constitute personal knowledge of the events. Rule 602 requires that non-expert witnesses have the opportunity and capacity to perceive a relevant fact, actually perceive it, remember perceiving it, and be able to communicate that perception. Ladd's admitted memory gap indicates he lacked the capacity to observe, even if he had the opportunity by being physically present. His attempt to fill the memory gap with a dream experienced months later does not provide the required foundation to show he had the opportunity or capacity to observe at the time, or that he can now recall what he may have observed. Furthermore, Ladd failed to designate expert witnesses to establish medical causation, which is required in complex cases involving obscure medical factors. This is a complex case involving multiple brain injuries and three separate automobile accidents, each of which could have potentially caused some or all of Ladd's injuries. Even if Ladd's testimony is sufficient to prove his less esoteric injuries, it is not enough to identify which of his multiple brain injuries were caused by which accident. Ladd's testimony alone invites speculation as to which injuries were caused by which accident. Additionally, Ladd's treating physicians, whom he designated as lay witnesses, cannot testify as to causation because they do not have personal knowledge of causation. Their testimony would go beyond factual description of personal observations during treatment and would amount to opinion testimony based on specialized knowledge, which requires expert witness designation under Rule 702. Without an expert witness designation, Ladd cannot establish causation.

No, summary judgment should not have been granted. Ladd's deposition testimony clearly recounts his memory of being struck by the defendants' semi-truck. At most, it may be ambiguous as to the relationship between that memory and the dream. Even if Ladd's testimony can be interpreted as indicating that his dream refreshed or revived his memory, his clear testimony that he now remembers the incident renders his testimony admissible. The ultimate accuracy and reliability of Ladd's memory is a question of fact that should have been decided by a jury. Furthermore, assuming Ladd's testimony is competent, his lay testimony would suffice to demonstrate that the defendants caused him substantial injury. It is undisputed that Ladd's injuries were caused by some combination of three collisions. To the extent Ladd can establish injuries that did not exist prior to the third collision involving the defendants, it becomes 'obvious' under the circumstances that such injuries were caused by that collision, and Ladd's lay testimony would be sufficient to establish causation for those injuries. The district court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and allowed Ladd to proceed with the development of his case.

Ladd v. BOWERS TRUCKING, INC.

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