La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott
24-50826 Document: 329-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/29/2025 (2025)
Rule of Law:
State election laws that regulate voter assistance, even if they add restrictions beyond those explicitly stated in Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, are not preempted by federal law unless Congress expresses a clear and manifest purpose to preempt such state exercises of historic police powers. Furthermore, pre-enforcement challenges to state election laws require plaintiffs to demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution, not merely speculative fears or generalized resource diversion unrelated to direct interference with core operations, to establish Article III standing.
Facts:
- On September 7, 2021, the Governor of Texas signed Senate Bill 1 (S.B. 1) into law, which included various provisions regulating how persons may assist voters.
- S.B. 1's Disclosure Provisions (§§ 6.03, 6.05, 6.07) require individuals assisting voters to provide information such as their name, address, relationship to the voter, and whether they received compensation, with non-compliance for mail-in ballot disclosures being a felony.
- S.B. 1's Oath Provision (§ 6.04) amends the existing assistor oath by adding language that clarifies it is taken 'under penalty of perjury,' states the voter represented eligibility for assistance, and requires the assistor to affirm they 'did not pressure or coerce the voter.'
- S.B. 1's Compensation Provisions (§§ 6.06, 7.04) criminalize compensating or accepting compensation for assisting mail-in voters, and for knowingly providing or offering 'vote harvesting services' in exchange for compensation or other benefit.
- 'Vote harvesting services' are defined by S.B. 1 as in-person interaction with voters in the physical presence of a ballot, intended to deliver votes for a specific candidate or measure.
- Plaintiff organizations, whose members require voting assistance or provide it as staff and volunteers, contend S.B. 1's provisions hinder their activities and voter assistance efforts.
- Plaintiff organizations OCA and LUPE have compensated staff for assisting voters and assert they would continue this practice but for the statute's proscription.
- Plaintiff organizations LUPE and LULAC Plaintiffs advocate for candidates and ballot measures through compensated, in-person interactions with voters in the physical presence of ballots, and state they have stopped these activities due to S.B. 1's new penalties.
Procedural Posture:
- Multiple plaintiff organizations, including La Union del Pueblo Entero, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, The Arc of Texas, OCA-Greater Houston, League of Women Voters of Texas, and LULAC Texas, filed lawsuits in federal district court (Western District of Texas), claiming that various provisions of Texas's S.B. 1 were preempted by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act.
- Named as defendants were the State of Texas, the Texas Secretary of State, the Texas Attorney General, several District Attorneys (including Harris County DA), and local election officials.
- Various Republican Committees (Harris County Republican Party, Dallas County Republican Party, Republican National Committee, etc.) were allowed to intervene as defendants after an initial denial by the district court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit.
- The district court found that at least one plaintiff organization had standing to challenge each of the challenged S.B. 1 provisions.
- On the merits, the district court held that VRA Section 208 preempted each of the challenged S.B. 1 provisions, interpreting Section 208 to mean that a State could not 'impose additional limitations or exceptions not stated in' Section 208.
- The district court permanently enjoined the State officials and District Attorneys from enforcing §§ 6.03, 6.04, 6.05, 6.06, 6.07, and 7.04 of S.B. 1.
- The State officials, the Intervenors, and the Harris County DA timely appealed this judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
1. Does Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which guarantees assistance to blind, disabled, or illiterate voters by a person of their choice (excluding employers/union agents), preempt state election laws that impose additional restrictions on voter assistance, such as prohibiting compensated assistance or paid ballot harvesting? 2. Do voter-assistance organizations have Article III standing to challenge state election laws regulating voter assistance based on speculative fears of prosecution, recruitment difficulties, or resource diversion not directly linked to a credible threat of enforcement for specific, prohibited conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge
No, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act does not preempt state election laws that impose additional restrictions on voter assistance beyond those explicitly listed in the federal statute, nor do voter-assistance organizations generally have standing to challenge such laws based on speculative fears. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. First, regarding standing, the court held that no plaintiff organization had Article III standing to challenge the Disclosure Provisions (§§ 6.03, 6.05, 6.07) or the Oath Provision (§ 6.04). The court found that alleged fears of prosecution for violating these provisions were 'speculative' and based on a 'highly attenuated chain of possibilities,' failing to show actual or imminent injury as required by Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA. Alleged recruitment difficulties were traceable to these baseless fears, not the defendants' actions. The court rejected the argument that a 'chilling effect' conferred standing outside of First Amendment claims, and that diversion of resources for education, as per FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Med., does not establish standing. The court also noted that the Oath Provision merely made existing law more explicit, and being afraid of falsely swearing an oath is not a traditionally recognized harm. However, the court found that OCA and LUPE had associational standing to challenge the Compensation Provision § 6.06, and the LUPE and LULAC Plaintiffs had standing to challenge § 7.04. These organizations demonstrated an intention to engage in conduct (compensating staff for assistance, or advocating for candidates via compensated in-person interactions) that is proscribed by these specific provisions, coupled with a credible threat of prosecution, distinguishing these claims from the speculative fears related to the Disclosure and Oath provisions, per Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus. Second, addressing preemption for the Compensation Provisions, the court determined that VRA Section 208 does not preempt §§ 6.06 and 7.04. The court applied a high threshold for 'purposes and objectives' conflict preemption and a presumption against preemption, given that election administration falls under states' historic police powers. Preemption requires Congress's 'clear and manifest purpose.' The plain text of Section 208, which states a voter 'may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union,' does not express a clear and manifest purpose to preempt all additional state voter assistance regulations. A maximalist reading would lead to absurd results, such as states being unable to bar assistance from minors, prisoners, candidates, or armed individuals. The court distinguished its prior ruling in OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, which concerned the scope of 'to vote' rather than 'person of the voter’s choice.' The court rejected the application of the expressio unius canon, stating that the listed exceptions (employer/union) are 'conceptually different' from the types of restrictions in S.B. 1 and do not imply an exhaustive list. Finally, the court dismissed reliance on the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, noting it is not law and cannot overcome the presumption against preemption; even if considered, it acknowledges a state's 'legitimate right' to establish election procedures.
Dissenting - James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge
Yes, S.B. 1’s Compensation Provisions are a violation of the Voting Rights Act, and the plaintiffs have standing to challenge S.B. 1’s Oath Provision and Disclosure Provisions. Judge Graves dissented, arguing that all challenged provisions should be preempted and that plaintiffs had standing to challenge all of them. Regarding standing, he contended that the majority overlooked the vagaries injected by S.B. 1 into the Oath Provision, which requires assistors to certify compliance with prospective events of indefinite duration (e.g., 'will not communicate information about how the voter has voted') and to ascertain another person's state of mind (e.g., 'did not pressure or coerce'). These ambiguities cause substantial confusion and deterrence, leading to cognizable injury beyond mere speculation. He pointed to specific testimony from Arc members who could not get assistance due to assistors' discomfort with the oath. For Disclosure and Oath provisions, he argued organizational standing was met through resource diversion (e.g., DST increasing budget for 'added training and enhanced education') and perceptible impairment of core functions (e.g., LUPE's staffing shortages and turning away members, MABA's difficulty recruiting volunteers, FIEL's 75% drop-off in volunteers). He distinguished FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine by noting that plaintiffs here were directly impacted by the law’s requirements on their operations, not merely advocating against it, aligning with Havens Realty Corp. and OCA-Greater Houston. Regarding preemption, Judge Graves argued that S.B. 1's Compensation Provisions are indeed preempted by VRA Section 208. He emphasized that 'choice' in Section 208 means voter autonomy and that the two explicit restrictions (employer/union) imply the exclusion of others, consistent with the expressio unius canon. He cited the Senate Judiciary Committee Report as authoritative legislative history, confirming Congress's intent to provide broad voter choice with only those two exceptions, and to displace state laws that 'unduly burden the right recognized in [Section 208].' He criticized the majority's application of the 'absurdity canon,' stating that its hypotheticals (Glock-carrying assistors, electioneering) are already addressed by existing general laws unrelated to voter assistance. S.B. 1's compensation ban, however, directly regulates the pool of eligible assistors by tacking on an assistor-exclusive requirement, thus directly interfering with the substantive right Congress created. He concluded that the VRA’s purpose was to create a guaranteed right to the voting process that could not be narrowed or limited by state legislation.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the Fifth Circuit's approach to preemption and standing in challenges to state election laws, particularly concerning voter assistance. By applying a stringent 'clear and manifest purpose' standard and a presumption against preemption, the court limits the perceived preemptive scope of VRA Section 208, giving states broader authority to regulate election procedures, even if those regulations add restrictions not explicitly found in federal law. The ruling also tightens Article III standing requirements for pre-enforcement challenges, particularly rejecting claims based on speculative fears or generalized resource diversion not directly tied to a credible threat of prosecution for specific, prohibited conduct. Future challenges to election integrity laws will likely need to demonstrate a higher likelihood of direct enforcement action to establish standing, potentially making it harder for advocacy groups to bring such cases.
