L.L.N. v. Clauder
563 N.W.2d 434, 1997 Wisc. LEXIS 55, 209 Wis. 2d 674 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits claims for negligent supervision against a religious organization if resolving the claim would require a court to interpret church law, policies, or practices, or if the alleged negligence stems from a religious doctrine like a vow of celibacy, rather than from secular standards of conduct.
Facts:
- In 1984, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc. (Diocese) assigned J. Gibbs Clauder, a priest, to serve as chaplain at Meriter Hospital in Madison, Wisconsin.
- Clauder resided at St. Bernard Catholic Church, where Father John Hebl was the parish pastor, but Hebl had no supervisory authority over Clauder.
- In November 1988, L.L.N. was hospitalized at Meriter Hospital for pregnancy complications, and Hebl asked Clauder to visit her; they discussed her pregnancy, politics, and the pro-life movement.
- In December 1988, after L.L.N. suffered a miscarriage while again hospitalized, she asked Clauder to visit her to discuss her grief, and after her discharge, he telephoned her at home; L.L.N. subsequently sent Clauder a thank-you note and invited him to lunch, which he accepted.
- In the following months, L.L.N. and Clauder continued to meet outside the hospital, dining, visiting art museums, attending rallies, exchanging gifts, and discussing personal problems, with L.L.N. viewing Clauder as her pastoral counselor.
- On June 29, 1990, Clauder invited L.L.N. to his family's cabin, where they engaged in sexual intercourse at a hotel in Rhinelander, and their sexual relationship continued until May 1991.
- On June 16, 1991, after ending the relationship, L.L.N. notified Bishop Cletus O'Donnell by letter of her sexual involvement with Clauder; the Diocese had no actual knowledge of their relationship before this time.
- Several years prior to L.L.N.'s letter, Hebl had witnessed an incident where he heard Clauder yell for help from his private room, entered to find Clauder straddling a woman named T.E. on the floor, holding down her hands, with Clauder bleeding from a bite on his wrist, and T.E.'s blouse torn; Hebl separated them and escorted T.E. out, but did not report the incident until after L.L.N.'s letter.
Procedural Posture:
- On May 28, 1993, L.L.N. filed a lawsuit against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc. (Diocese), claiming negligent supervision and vicarious liability for Clauder's actions, and against Clauder personally for sexual exploitation.
- On May 31, 1994, the Diocese filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the negligent supervision claim was precluded by the First Amendment.
- On January 3, 1995, the Circuit Court for Dane County (George A. W. Northrup, Judge) granted summary judgment to the Diocese on all counts.
- L.L.N. appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.
- The court of appeals (L.L.N. v. Clauder, 203 Wis. 2d 570, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1996)) affirmed summary judgment on the vicarious liability claims but reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent supervision claim, concluding it could be resolved under neutral rules of law.
- The Diocese sought review of the court of appeals' reversal regarding the negligent supervision claim.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, or, in the alternative, do the undisputed facts fail to establish that the Diocese knew or should have known about Father Clauder's alleged propensity to sexually exploit patients?
Opinions:
Majority - N. Patrick Crooks
Yes, the First Amendment prohibits L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim, and even if it didn't, the undisputed facts do not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Diocese's notice of Clauder's alleged propensity to sexually exploit patients. The court concluded that allowing the negligent supervision claim would lead to excessive governmental entanglement with religion, violating the Establishment Clause. First, to determine if Father Hebl's knowledge of the T.E. incident could be imputed to the Diocese, a court would need to consider church law, policies, or practices to ascertain Hebl's authority or duty to report Clauder, as he had no official supervisory role. Second, even with constructive knowledge of Clauder's relationship with T.E., determining negligent supervision would require interpreting the vow of celibacy. The consensual sexual acts between Clauder and T.E. were not legally wrong in a secular context, and their 'wrongness' arose solely from church doctrine. Holding the Diocese to a higher civil duty based on a religious tenet would improperly entangle the court in religious affairs, akin to creating a 'reasonable cleric' standard. Furthermore, even assuming no constitutional bar, the undisputed facts do not establish notice. At most, the T.E. incident would have indicated Clauder was not celibate and engaged in a consensual relationship with a single, adult non-patient. This knowledge is insufficient to put the Diocese on notice that Clauder was likely to abuse his chaplain position to sexually exploit vulnerable patients. The court found it illogical to conclude that such knowledge would predict sexual exploitation. When viewing the entire record, including Clauder's call for help and Hebl's perception that T.E. attacked Clauder, the incident did not reasonably infer sexually assaultive behavior by Clauder towards T.E.
Dissenting - Ann Walsh Bradley
No, the Diocese is not entitled to summary judgment on L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding notice, and the majority unnecessarily and erroneously resolves the First Amendment issue. The dissent argued that when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to L.L.N., there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Diocese should have known about Clauder's propensity for sexually harmful behavior. The incident Hebl witnessed (Clauder straddling T.E., her torn blouse, Clauder's bitten wrist) could reasonably infer sexually assaultive behavior, not just a consensual relationship. Hebl himself considered a 'sexual possibility' and later described the incident as 'suspicious,' and expert witnesses suggested it warranted evaluation. The majority erred by usurping the jury's role in selecting facts and inferences. The dissent also contended that the majority should not have reached the constitutional issue, given the factual dispute. Even if addressed, the First Amendment analysis was flawed: (1) Clauder's breach of his vow of celibacy, while an ecclesiastical indiscretion, is not the sole basis for the negligent supervision claim and does not require a court to interpret religious doctrine to find negligence; (2) Determining agency relationships (between Clauder/Hebl and the Diocese) can be done using 'neutral principles' of state law, just as with secular entities, without implicating the First Amendment. Prohibiting such inquiries would grant religious organizations blanket immunity from tort liability, which the First Amendment does not intend, especially in cases of known danger or severe sexual misconduct.
Concurring - William A. Bablitch
The Diocese is entitled to summary judgment based on the lack of notice, but the First Amendment issue should not have been reached. Justice Bablitch joined the majority's conclusion that the Diocese was entitled to summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of notice. However, he emphasized the judicial principle that constitutional questions should not be decided if a case can be resolved on other, non-constitutional grounds. Therefore, he expressed no opinion on the First Amendment issue.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the protection afforded to religious organizations under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, particularly concerning negligent supervision claims involving clergy. It establishes a high bar for plaintiffs seeking to impose liability, requiring a showing that negligence can be determined without excessive entanglement in religious doctrine or practices, such as interpreting vows of celibacy or internal disciplinary procedures. Furthermore, the case clarifies that general knowledge of a cleric's consensual sexual relationships, even if violating religious tenets, may not be sufficient to establish notice of a propensity for sexually exploitative behavior towards vulnerable individuals, particularly in a non-secular employment context. Future cases will likely scrutinize carefully whether the 'neutral principles of law' can be applied without requiring courts to make sensitive judgments about religious beliefs or governance, making it difficult to proceed with negligent supervision claims against religious entities unless the allegations involve clearly secular, criminal conduct where notice is unequivocally established without religious interpretation.
