No. The guest is not guilty because a renter's invitation is more powerful than a landlord's ban. To be guilty of trespassing, you have to be somewhere without any permission. L.D.L. had a good reason for being there: he was invited by people who lived in the complex. The first judge made a mistake by thinking the landlord's rules were more important than a renter's right to have visitors. Renters are allowed to have guests, even in shared areas like hallways and laundry rooms.

No, the owner of the apartment building can't stop a tenant's guest from visiting, even with a police warning. I'm overturning the earlier decision because the first court made a mistake. They thought the building owner's rules were more important than the tenants' rights to have visitors. But that's not correct. When you rent an apartment, you're allowed to have guests over, even in shared areas like courtyards, unless your lease specifically says you can't. L.D.L. said he was visiting his brother who lived there, and he had other family and friends living there too. Someone who lived there even said L.D.L. was allowed to visit. The prosecutors couldn't prove beyond any doubt that L.D.L. was trespassing. There were too many good reasons why he might have been there legally. So, we can't say he's guilty of trespassing.

I don't agree with what the other judges decided. (We don't know exactly why because it's not written in the main text.)

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b1393-9">SHIVERS, Chief Judge.</author>
Defendant L.D.L., a child, appeals final judgment and sentence finding him guilty of trespass after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and placing him on community control. At issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty on the charge of trespass. We reverse.
The Griffin Heights Apartments on Basin Street in Tallahassee is a low-rent federally subsidized housing project. By letter dated August 3, 1988, WWH Realty Investors 3G, Ltd., d/b/a Griffin Heights Apartments advised the Tallahassee Police Department that it “gave authority to the Tallahassee Police Department to issue no trespass warnings and/or to arrest any persons loitering on the property who are not residents.”
Acting upon their authority, the police, on November 21, 1988, issued a trespass warning to the appellant for loitering around the laundry area of the apartment complex. Appellant at that time indicated that he lived near Arkansas or California Streets.
Four and one half months later, on March 30, 1989, Officers Coleman and Goldwick were patrolling through the Basin Street Project between 9 and 11 p.m. They saw a large group of juveniles gathered on the east side of the “H” building. Officer Coleman testified that it is not unusual at all for many of the teenagers who live in the complex to hang around the “H” building/laundry room area at night. The officers observed that every time they drove past this group, one juvenile in particular — the appellant — would run northbound toward the laundry room area. Both officers testified that it was obvious appellant was leaving the area due to their presence, since appellant would literally run in the opposite direction every time the officers drove by.
Because of appellant’s “suspicious” behavior, the police decided to pursue appellant on foot. Officer Coleman testified that he observed appellant run north through the laundry room area, through the complex, and eventually stop on the second-floor balcony of the “C” building, in front of Linda Rollins’ apartment, where appellant was finally apprehended. When the police questioned appellant after apprehending him, appellant did not say he was visiting Linda Rollins. Appellant instead stated that he “stayed” at Rollins’ apartment.
Officer Goldwick testified that when appellant first saw Goldwick coming toward him, he ran past the “C” building, where Rollins’ apartment was located. Officer Goldwick also indicated that he could not recall if there was anyone else with appellant at the time he first came on the scene at Rollins’ apartment, but stated that “[tjhere could have been.”
Linda Rollins testified that appellant, a good friend of the family, is allowed to be a visitor to her apartment. Ms. Rollins stated that her son was on the porch with appellant outside her apartment when appellant was arrested.
Appellant’s friend testified that around 10:30 p.m. he ran into appellant while he was on his way back from the convenience store. He and appellant then walked to his apartment. His friend testified that he did not see appellant run away from the police.
Appellant testified that his friends, grandmother and brother lived at the complex. Appellant testified that he was not visiting at Ms. Rollins’ apartment on the night of his arrest, but he was with his brother. He stated that his brother lived in Apt. 246-L. Appellant further testified <page-number citation-index="1" label="1312">*1312</page-number>that he was with his brother when the police arrived, and everyone including his brother had left upon seeing the police. Appellant stated that he knew he had been given a trespass warning, and that was one reason he ran when he saw the police.
Appellant, a juvenile, was charged by petition filed in the circuit court with one count of trespass on property after warning in violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes. He was tried and found guilty as charged. Adjudication of delinquency was withheld and appellant was placed on community control.
Section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes, reads:
<blockquote id="b1394-6">810.09 Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.—</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b1394-7">(1)Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance as to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation as described in s. 810.011, commits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.</blockquote>
In order to be found guilty of the crime of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance, the State is required to prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
<blockquote id="b1394-9">(1) that the defendant willfully entered the property alleged;</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b1394-10">(2) the property was owned by or lawfully in possession of the person alleged;</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b1394-11">(3) notice not to enter had been given by actual communication to the defendant; and</blockquote>
<blockquote id="b1394-12">(4) that defendant’s entering the property was without permission.</blockquote>
See R.C.W. v. State, 507 So.2d 700, 701-702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) “Trespass — On Property Other Than a Structure or Conveyance.”
The State did not prove each element of the offense of trespass — violation of section 810.09(1), Florida Statutes — beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the evidence presented it appears that the trier of fact could not reasonably conclude the evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant’s innocence. The appellant presented a reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. Appellant testified that he was visiting his brother at the complex. He testified that he was with his brother at the time the officers first spotted him, and that his brother lived at the complex. Not only did appellant’s brother live at the complex but so did appellant’s grandmother and appellant’s friend. The mother of appellant’s friend testified that appellant is a good friend of the family and is allowed to be a visitor at their apartment. An examination of Linda Rollins’ lease in the record did not reveal a prohibition against having visitors.
At the end of the hearing the trial judge announced that it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that L.D.L. wasn’t there by invitation or by implied invitation of the lessee. She stated that he certainly was not there by invitation or permission of the owner. The trial court announced and ruled that the owner’s rights are not superseded by the lessee’s rights, and that there are remedies other than just by violating the trespass warning, if they wanted that trespass warning removed.
We find the trial court applied an erroneous standard. A landlord generally does not have the right to deny entry to persons a tenant has invited to come onto his property. This law also applies to the common areas of the premises. Right of third person to enter premises against objection of the landlord, 6 A.L.R. 465. See also 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, sections 228, 235.
<blockquote id="b1394-18">In the absence of any restriction in the agreement between the landlord and his tenant, the tenant, when in possession of the demised premises, has the right to invite or permit such persons as his business interests or pleasure may suggest . to come upon the premises so in his possession, for any lawful purpose, and the landlord has no right to prohibit such persons from coming on the demised premises. One who thus comes upon the <page-number citation-index="1" label="1313">*1313</page-number>premises upon the invitation of the tenant, although expressly forbidden to do so by the landlord, is not guilty of criminal trespass. 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, section 235.</blockquote>
REVERSED.
<judges id="AenS">ERVIN, J., concurs.</judges>
<judges id="APOc">NIMMONS, J., dissents.</judges>
</opinion>

Yes. A defendant is not guilty of criminal trespass if they are on the premises at the invitation of a tenant, as the tenant's right to invite guests for lawful purposes overrides a landlord's general prohibition. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that L.D.L. was on the property without permission, which is a required element of the offense. L.D.L. presented a reasonable hypothesis of innocence—that he was visiting either his brother or his friend, both of whom were residents—and the State did not rebut this. The trial court erred by ruling that the property owner's right to exclude individuals superseded the tenant's right to invite them. A landlord generally cannot deny entry to persons a tenant has invited, and this right extends to the common areas of the premises.

No. The evidence presented does not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for trespass. I reverse the trial court's decision because the court applied an erroneous standard in its ruling. The trial court incorrectly stated that the owner's rights are not superseded by the lessee's rights. However, this is not the correct legal principle. A landlord generally does not have the right to deny entry to persons a tenant has invited to come onto the property, including common areas. This principle applies unless there is a specific restriction in the agreement between the landlord and tenant. L.D.L. presented a reasonable hypothesis of innocence by testifying that he was visiting his brother, who lived in the complex. Additionally, L.D.L.'s grandmother and friend also lived in the complex, and a resident testified that L.D.L. was allowed to be a visitor to her apartment. The State failed to prove each element of the trespass offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented was not inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of L.D.L.'s innocence. Therefore, the conviction for trespass cannot stand.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. (Note: The full content of the dissent is not provided in the given text.)

L.D.L. v. State

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