Krulewitch v. United States
336 U.S. 440 (1949)
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Rule of Law:
A co-conspirator's out-of-court declaration is not admissible against another conspirator under the hearsay exception if the declaration was made after the conspiracy's central objectives were achieved or had failed, as such a statement is not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Facts:
- Petitioner Krulewitch and a woman defendant allegedly induced another woman to travel from New York City to Miami, Florida, for the purpose of prostitution.
- The woman made the trip to Miami on October 20, 1941.
- By December 1941, more than a month and a half later, the woman had already left Florida and returned to her residence in New York.
- At this point in December 1941, Krulewitch, his female co-defendant, and the complaining witness had all been arrested.
- After the arrests, the female co-defendant, in Krulewitch's absence, allegedly told the complaining witness not to talk to authorities.
- The co-defendant also allegedly stated, 'It would be better for us two girls to take the blame than Kay (the defendant) because he couldn’t stand it, he couldn’t stand to take it.'
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Krulewitch was charged in a federal district court with inducing a woman for prostitution, transporting her for that purpose, and conspiracy.
- After being tried alone, Krulewitch was convicted by a jury on all three counts.
- Krulewitch appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Krulewitch's petition for a writ of certiorari, limiting its review to the question of whether certain hearsay testimony was properly admitted into evidence.
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Issue:
Does the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule permit the admission of a conspirator's statement made after the conspiracy's main objectives have been completed, based on the theory that there is an implicit, subsidiary conspiracy to conceal the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Black
No. A hearsay declaration attributed to a co-conspirator is not admissible against another conspirator if it was made after the central objectives of the conspiracy had either failed or been achieved. The court rejected the government's theory of an implied, continuing subsidiary conspiracy of concealment. The established co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule requires that the statement be made in furtherance of the objectives of a 'going conspiracy.' By the time the statement was made, the central aim of the conspiracy—transporting the woman to Florida for prostitution—had long since ended. To adopt the government's theory would create a broad and automatic new exception to the rule against hearsay in all conspiracy cases, a step the Court was unwilling to take. Furthermore, the admission of this testimony was not harmless error, as the case against the petitioner was not so strong that the court could be certain the testimony did not tip the scales against him.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Jackson
No. While concurring fully with the majority's reasoning and judgment, this opinion was written to elaborate on the dangers of the expanding and ill-defined crime of conspiracy. The 'implied conspiracy' theory advanced by the government is an ominous expansion of the law, as it has no logical limits in duration or scope and is irreconcilable with the presumption of innocence. Creating such a 'constructive conspiracy' is akin to creating a new judge-made offense, which is impermissible in federal law. The abuse of conspiracy charges provides prosecutors with unfair procedural advantages, and it is 'better that the crime go unwhipped of justice than that this theory of implied continuance of conspiracy find lodgment in our law.'
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Burton
No. While agreeing with the majority that the hearsay testimony was not properly admissible, its admission constituted harmless error and should not result in a reversal. The evidence supporting the jury's verdict was so cumulative, repetitive, and corroborated that this single piece of hearsay from an unreliable witness could not have had a substantial influence on the jury's decision. Given that this was the fourth trial on the matter, setting aside the verdict on such a minor evidentiary issue is an unrealistic procedure that makes a 'travesty of the jury system.'
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the scope of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule by rejecting the 'implied conspiracy of concealment' doctrine. The ruling reinforces the temporal limits of a conspiracy, establishing that it terminates upon the achievement or failure of its central criminal objectives. By refusing to extend the conspiracy's life to include subsequent acts of concealment, the Court prevented a major expansion of prosecutorial power and hearsay admissibility. Justice Jackson's influential concurring opinion has become a foundational critique of the broad application of conspiracy law, frequently cited by courts and scholars concerned with its potential for abuse and infringement on individual rights.
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