Krouse v. Graham
19 Cal. 3d 59, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
In a wrongful death action, plaintiffs may recover for nonpecuniary damages such as the loss of love, companionship, comfort, and society, but not for their own grief or sorrow. For a bystander to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must suffer a physical injury resulting from the shock of a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, which does not require visual perception of the moment of impact.
Facts:
- The Krouse family's car was parked at a curb while Benjamin Krouse remained in the driver's seat.
- His wife, Elizabeth Krouse, and their neighbor, Vinka Mladinov, were standing on the curb next to the car after removing groceries from the back seat.
- A vehicle driven by the defendant approached from the rear, drove onto the curb, and struck both Elizabeth Krouse and Vinka Mladinov before hitting the Krouse's car.
- Elizabeth Krouse was killed and Vinka Mladinov was injured.
- Benjamin Krouse did not visually see the moment of impact on his wife but was aware of her location, saw the defendant's car approaching at high speed on a collision course, and perceived the collision as it occurred.
- As a result of witnessing the event, Benjamin Krouse suffered physical injuries, including a broken shoulder, and later developed a gastric disturbance stemming from the severe emotional trauma.
Procedural Posture:
- Benjamin Krouse, his children, and Vinka Mladinov filed suit against the defendant driver in a California trial court.
- The defendant admitted liability, and the trial proceeded only on the issue of damages.
- The jury awarded $300,000 to the Krouse plaintiffs for wrongful death, $52,000 to Benjamin Krouse for his personal injuries and emotional distress, and $90,000 to Vinka Mladinov for her personal injuries.
- The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing instructional error and jury misconduct, which the trial court denied.
- The defendant, as appellant, appealed the judgment and the denial of the new trial motion to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
In a wrongful death action, may damages be awarded for nonpecuniary losses such as loss of companionship and society, but not for the heirs' own mental and emotional distress? Furthermore, does the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement for bystander recovery for emotional distress necessitate that the plaintiff visually perceive the injury-producing event and suffer a resulting physical injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Richardson, J.
Yes, damages in a wrongful death action may include compensation for nonpecuniary losses like companionship and society, but not for the heirs' grief and sorrow. Furthermore, No, the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement does not demand visual perception of the impact, but Yes, it does require that the resulting emotional distress cause a physical injury. Wrongful death damages in California, despite historical references to 'pecuniary loss,' have long compensated for the loss of a decedent's society, comfort, and protection. Instructing a jury to award such nonpecuniary damages while also limiting them to 'pecuniary loss' is confusing; the proper approach is to allow recovery for loss of society and simply instruct juries to exclude grief and sorrow. However, the trial court's instructions improperly allowed the jury to award damages for the Krouse heirs' mental and emotional distress, which constitutes prejudicial error. Regarding bystander recovery under Dillon v. Legg, the requirement of 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' is met when a plaintiff perceives the event through their senses as it occurs, even without seeing the precise moment of impact. Benjamin Krouse, aware of his wife's position and seeing the car's approach, was a percipient witness. The trial court's instruction was still erroneous because it allowed recovery for merely 'being present' at the scene, without requiring the jury to find that the emotional shock from observing the event caused a physical injury. This error, combined with conflicting evidence on the cause of Benjamin's gastric condition, was prejudicial, requiring reversal of both the wrongful death and bystander recovery verdicts.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
This opinion concurs with the majority's reversal of the wrongful death and bystander recovery verdicts but dissents from the decision to vacate the order denying a new trial for the Mladinov verdict. The majority's decision to allow the trial court to consider jurors' declarations about including attorneys' fees in their award improperly delves into the jurors' subjective mental processes, which is forbidden by Evidence Code section 1150. These declarations do not constitute proof of 'overt acts, objectively ascertainable,' but rather reflect the jurors' private thoughts and reasoning. Permitting such inquiries will undermine the finality of jury verdicts and encourage losing parties to harass jurors in an attempt to impeach unfavorable results.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies two distinct areas of California tort law. For wrongful death claims, it moves away from the confusing legal fiction of assigning a 'pecuniary value' to non-economic losses, establishing that loss of society, companionship, and comfort are directly compensable, while firmly excluding grief and sorrow. For bystander recovery (NIED), it refines the Dillon v. Legg test by broadening the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' requirement beyond strict visual perception, allowing recovery for those who perceive the event through other senses. At the same time, it reinforces the requirement that the emotional shock must manifest in a physical injury, thereby expanding one element of the test while solidifying another.
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