Kroll v. Nehmer
1998 Md. LEXIS 18, 705 A.2d 716, 348 Md. 616 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation will not be applied to invalidate the revocation of a will if the revoked will and the new, but invalid, will have substantially different dispositive schemes. In such cases, the testator's intent to disinherit the former beneficiaries is so clear that they would likely prefer intestacy over reviving the old will.
Facts:
- On April 12, 1985, Margaret Binco executed a valid will leaving her estate to various individuals and charities, but not to her brother, Henry J. Kroll.
- On June 28, 1990, Binco handwrote a new will that named a completely different set of beneficiaries than the 1985 will.
- Contemporaneously with creating the 1990 will, Binco wrote “VOID—NEW WILL DRAWN UP 6-28-90” on the back of her 1985 will.
- Binco later created a fourth will on October 27, 1994, which was also handwritten.
- Both the 1990 and 1994 wills were legally invalid because they lacked the required signatures of attesting witnesses.
- Margaret Binco died on December 19, 1994.
- As Binco's closest surviving relative, her brother Henry J. Kroll would inherit her entire estate if she died intestate (without a valid will).
Procedural Posture:
- The personal representative named in the 1985 will offered it for probate in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore County.
- Henry J. Kroll, the decedent's brother, objected, arguing the 1985 will had been revoked.
- The Orphans’ Court (a trial-level court for probate matters) applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation and admitted the 1985 will to probate.
- Kroll, as appellant, appealed the decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
- The Circuit Court affirmed the Orphans' Court, finding the revocation of the 1985 will was dependent on the validity of the 1990 will.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) granted a writ of certiorari on its own initiative before the case was heard by the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of dependent relative revocation prevent the revocation of a prior will when the testator physically cancels it under the mistaken belief that a new, contemporaneously executed will is valid, particularly when the dispositive schemes of the two wills are substantially different?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilner, J.
No, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not prevent the revocation under these circumstances. The doctrine, which is based on the testator's presumed intent, should not be applied when the dispositive schemes of the revoked will and the new, invalid will are radically different. The core inquiry is what the testator would have desired had she known the new will was invalid. A comparison of the 1985 and 1990 wills reveals two entirely different dispositive schemes, with the 1990 will replacing all beneficiaries from the 1985 will. This demonstrates a clear intent by Ms. Binco to disinherit the beneficiaries of the 1985 will. Applying the doctrine would reinstate a testamentary plan she clearly abandoned, which is contrary to her presumed intent. The court cannot presume that she would prefer to give her estate to people she intended to disinherit over allowing it to pass by intestacy to her brother. Therefore, the revocation of the 1985 will was effective.
Concurring - Eldridge, J.
Concurred in the result only, without providing a separate written opinion.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (DRR) in Maryland, even while the court refrains from formally adopting it as state law. The ruling establishes that a substantial difference between the dispositive schemes of a revoked will and a subsequent invalid will is strong evidence against applying DRR. It prioritizes the testator's most recent dispositive intent—even if imperfectly executed—over a mechanically applied legal fiction. This case serves as a crucial precedent, signaling to future courts that DRR is a doctrine of presumed intent, not a mandatory rule, and should be rejected when evidence suggests the testator would have preferred intestacy to reviving an outdated estate plan.
