Kristie's Katering, Inc. v. Ameri
2000 Ark. App. LEXIS 798, 35 S.W.3d 807, 72 Ark. App. 102 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
An employer can be held directly liable for negligent supervision of employees if it fails to provide adequate training and oversight, and such negligence proximately causes injury to a third party, even if the employee's specific tortious act might also have a personal motivation.
Facts:
- Nasser Ameri, a UALR graduate, regularly visited the Discovery Club for entertainment.
- On July 21, 1996, Ameri was at the Discovery Club where his friend, Saif, became involved in a verbal confrontation.
- Ameri attempted to separate Saif and the other man, but was unsuccessful, and the club was announced to be closing.
- As Ameri was leaving, a security guard, Lamont Charleston, grabbed him from behind with his arm around Ameri’s neck, choking him.
- While Charleston held Ameri, another security guard hit Ameri in the face with his fist, breaking Ameri’s nose.
- Approximately six weeks prior to this incident, Ameri had a dispute with Lamont Charleston in the Discovery Club's parking lot, during which Charleston told Ameri, 'I will get you.'
- Norman Jones, the president and sole shareholder of Kristie’s Katering (owner of the Discovery Club), admitted that he had no formal training program, manuals, materials, or written rules for security guards.
- Ameri incurred approximately $6,300 in medical bills for his injuries.
- Abdullah Alkhomairi, a friend of Ameri, corroborated Ameri's account of the incident via deposition.
Procedural Posture:
- Nasser Ameri sued Kristie’s Katering, Inc., in Pulaski County circuit court, alleging injuries sustained at the Discovery Club.
- A Pulaski County jury returned a verdict awarding Nasser Ameri $16,000 in damages.
- Kristie’s Katering, Inc. filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Kristie’s Katering, Inc., appealed the jury's decision to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, or in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict when there is conflicting evidence regarding an employer's negligent supervision of security guards that leads to a patron's injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Sam Bird
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial for alleged juror misconduct, nor in denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of negligent supervision. The court affirmed on all points of appeal. Regarding juror misconduct, Kristie’s failed to present evidence that juror Joan Cunningham knowingly withheld information or was biased; the burden is on the moving party to show prejudice and unawareness of bias until after trial, and appellate courts review such denials for abuse of discretion. The court found no reversible error regarding Norman Jones’s testimony, noting the appellant’s duty to provide a complete record demonstrating error. Crucially, the court found substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict of negligence. To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show damages, breach of the standard of care, and proximate cause. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ameri, the court noted Ameri's and Alkhomairi’s detailed testimony and Jones's admission of no formal training for security guards. The court clarified that the theory of negligent supervision is distinct from respondeat superior, as it premises liability on the employer’s direct wrongful conduct (e.g., failure to train), which was sufficient to constitute proximate cause even if an employee had personal motives. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting medical bills despite discovery disputes, or in allowing a deposition for an out-of-state witness under Ark. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(B).
Dissenting - John B. Robbins
No, the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence regarding negligent supervision because Ameri’s injuries were caused by intentional malice on the part of the security personnel, which the employer could not have reasonably foreseen or prevented. Chief Judge Robbins dissented, arguing that Ameri’s own testimony indicated the attack was motivated by revenge stemming from a prior altercation, making it a personal and intentional act. He contended that no amount of training or background checks would likely have prevented such an incident. To hold Kristie’s liable under these circumstances, he argued, would make it an insurer of its patrons' safety, rather than requiring it to exercise reasonable care against foreseeable harm. The Chief Judge concluded that Ameri's proper remedy lay against the individual employees who attacked him, not against the employer for negligent supervision, as the injuries were not a result of the employer's lack of reasonable care.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinction between an employer's vicarious liability (respondeat superior) and direct liability (negligent supervision), emphasizing that businesses bear an independent duty to properly train and supervise employees, especially in roles involving potential physical altercations. The ruling reinforces that a business's failure to establish adequate safety protocols can be a direct cause of a patron's injury, even if the employee's specific actions may stem from personal motivations. It also underscores the high burden placed on appellants to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to overturn a jury's verdict, particularly concerning juror misconduct or the sufficiency of evidence to establish negligence.
