Krinsky v. Doe 6
159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 36 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff seeking to discover the identity of an anonymous defendant who has posted allegedly defamatory statements online must first make a prima facie showing of the elements of libel to overcome the defendant's First Amendment right to anonymous speech.
Facts:
- Lisa Krinsky was the president, chair of the board, and chief operating officer of SFBC International, Inc., a publicly traded company, until December 31, 2005.
- An anonymous user, under the screen name "Senor_Pinche_Wey" (later known as Doe 6), posted messages on a Yahoo! Finance message board regarding SFBC and its executives.
- The posts were part of a heated online discussion among investors and critics concerning SFBC's management and financial performance.
- On December 18, 2005, Doe 6 posted a message referring to SFBC management as "boobs, losers and crooks," and parenthetically listed "(Krinsky, Natan and Seifer)."
- On December 30, 2005, Doe 6 posted a satirical list of fictional New Year's resolutions for another executive, which included a vulgar statement that he would "reciprocate felatoin with Lisa even though she has fat thighs, a fake medical degree, ‘queefs’ and has poor feminine hygiene."
Procedural Posture:
- Lisa Krinsky filed a lawsuit against 10 anonymous 'Doe' defendants in a Florida state court for libel and intentional interference with a business relationship.
- To discover the identity of the defendants, Krinsky served a subpoena in California on the message board host, Yahoo! Inc.
- Yahoo! notified the user 'Senor_Pinche_Wey' (Doe 6) that it would comply with the subpoena unless a legal objection was filed.
- Doe 6 filed a motion to quash the subpoena in California Superior Court, arguing it violated his First Amendment right to anonymous speech.
- The Superior Court denied Doe 6's motion to quash.
- Doe 6 (appellant) appealed the Superior Court's order to the California Court of Appeal, with Krinsky as the respondent.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
To overcome an anonymous speaker's First Amendment right to speak anonymously online, must a plaintiff seeking to discover the speaker's identity through a subpoena first make a prima facie showing that the speaker's statements were libelous?
Opinions:
Majority - Elia, J.
Yes. A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of libel to justify the disclosure of an anonymous internet speaker's identity. The First Amendment protects anonymous speech on the internet, but this protection does not extend to defamatory statements. To balance the plaintiff's right to seek redress against the defendant's right to anonymity, the court must require the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence of the elements of their libel claim. The court rejected adopting a procedural label like 'summary judgment' or 'motion to dismiss' for this standard, instead focusing on the substantive evidentiary showing. Applying this standard, the court examined Doe 6's statements in the context of the informal and hyperbolic nature of an internet message board. It concluded that the posts—including terms like 'crook' and vulgar insults about Krinsky's degree and hygiene—were crude, satirical hyperbole and protected opinion, not actionable assertions of objective fact under Florida law. Because Krinsky failed to make a prima facie showing of libel, Doe 6's First Amendment right to anonymity prevails, and the subpoena to discover his identity must be quashed. The related claim for intentional interference with a business relationship also fails because it is based on the same non-actionable, constitutionally protected speech.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant procedural safeguard for anonymous online speech in California. By requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of libel before unmasking a speaker, the court sets a higher bar than a mere good-faith pleading standard, thereby protecting speakers from retaliatory or meritless lawsuits designed to silence critics (SLAPP suits). The decision emphasizes a contextual analysis of internet speech, recognizing that forums like message boards are often filled with hyperbole, opinion, and venting rather than factual assertions. This approach provides a framework for future courts to distinguish between actionable defamation and protected, albeit offensive, online commentary, thereby shaping the balance between reputation rights and free expression in the digital age.
