Kramer v. Thompson
947 F.2d 666 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a court of equity may not issue an injunction to prohibit future defamatory speech or compel the retraction of past libelous statements, even after a judicial determination that the statements are false and defamatory. The sole remedy for libel is an action for damages.
Facts:
- In 1982, Richard Thompson hired attorney Steven M. Kramer to represent him in a securities fraud claim.
- In 1985, Kramer informed an F.B.I. agent that Thompson's stocks had lost substantial value but were not technically worthless, which angered Thompson.
- Thompson fired Kramer in October 1985, leading to a fee dispute during which Kramer retained the case files pending a court order.
- Beginning in early 1986, Thompson initiated a widespread letter-writing campaign, accusing Kramer of throwing his case, using drugs, having connections to organized crime, and committing arson.
- Kramer demanded a retraction of these statements, but Thompson refused.
- After a two-year hiatus, Thompson resumed his defamatory campaign in 1989, contacting the opposing counsel in an unrelated case involving Kramer to repeat the accusations.
Procedural Posture:
- Kramer first filed a libel action against Thompson in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, a state trial court.
- The state trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability against Thompson for his failure to comply with discovery.
- Kramer later filed a second libel action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity of citizenship.
- At the close of Kramer's case at trial, the district court directed a verdict for Kramer on the issue of liability.
- A jury awarded Kramer $100,000 in compensatory and $38,000 in punitive damages.
- The district court entered a judgment for the damages and also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Thompson from repeating the libelous statements and ordering him to issue letters of retraction.
- Thompson was subsequently held in civil contempt for violating the injunction.
- Thompson (appellant) appealed the injunctive orders and the damages judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with Kramer as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a court have the authority under Pennsylvania law to issue an injunction prohibiting future defamatory statements and mandating the retraction of past libelous statements after those statements have been judicially determined to be libelous?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker, Circuit Judge
No. A court does not have the authority under Pennsylvania law to enjoin future libelous speech or compel a retraction. The court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adhere to its precedent in Willing v. Mazzocone, which established that enjoining libel constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint under the Pennsylvania Constitution. While acknowledging that a prior jury determination of libel might obviate the traditional objections to such injunctions (i.e., denial of a jury trial and prior restraint), the court concluded that Pennsylvania's unique and historical solicitude for free expression would prevent it from adopting this minority-view exception. The court reasoned that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would continue to rely on the adequacy of legal remedies—specifically, an action for damages—as a bar to equitable relief, regardless of whether a jury has already found the statements to be libelous. Furthermore, the court found no legal precedent whatsoever for a compelled retraction, viewing it as a form of compelled speech that is likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as suggested by Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Pennsylvania's position as providing exceptionally strong protection against prior restraints on speech, even in the context of proven defamation. It confirms that the traditional rule against enjoining libel, as articulated in Willing v. Mazzocone, remains absolute in the commonwealth, without the exceptions recognized by other jurisdictions. The ruling establishes that even a persistent and malicious libeler cannot be silenced by a court order; the plaintiff's only recourse is to pursue monetary damages repeatedly. This creates a significant practical hurdle for victims of defamation, as it leaves them without a mechanism to proactively stop ongoing reputational harm from a defendant undeterred by damage awards.
