Kramer v. Ricksmeier
139 N.W. 1091, 159 Iowa 48 (1913)
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Rule of Law:
Mere words, spoken without an accompanying unlawful act or threat of imminent physical harm, are not legally actionable, even if they willfully and maliciously cause emotional distress that results in physical injury.
Facts:
- The plaintiff was recovering from inflammatory rheumatism, which left her in an enfeebled and nervous state.
- On or about April 12th, while the plaintiff's husband was away from home, the defendant called the plaintiff on the telephone.
- The defendant, in an angry and vociferous manner, informed the plaintiff that her husband's cattle had escaped their enclosure.
- Using profane language, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to take charge of the cattle and intimated he would come to her home to 'avenge himself'.
- As a direct result of the phone call, the plaintiff became greatly shocked and nervous, causing a relapse into her feeble condition which resulted in sickness, debility, and permanent disability.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant in a trial court to recover damages.
- The defendant filed a demurrer, arguing that even if the facts alleged were true, they did not constitute a legally valid cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, dismissing the plaintiff's case.
- The plaintiff (appellant) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Iowa Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state a valid cause of action for damages by alleging that the defendant's willful, malicious, and profane language over the telephone caused fright and shock that resulted in physical injury, when the defendant's underlying act of complaining was not itself unlawful?
Opinions:
Majority - Evans, J.
No, a plaintiff does not state a valid cause of action for damages under these circumstances. Recovery for physical injuries resulting from fright or emotional distress is generally not permitted where the defendant's conduct was not independently unlawful or did not place the plaintiff in reasonable fear of immediate physical injury. The court reasoned that mere words, even if malicious and profane, do not constitute a legal assault and are generally considered too remote and speculative to serve as a basis for damages. Distinguishing this case from precedents like Watson v. Dilts, where the defendant committed an unlawful trespass, the court found the defendant here was within his legal rights to complain about the wandering cattle. Because the defendant's act of telephoning and complaining was not legally wrongful, the resulting harm, however unfortunate, is not compensable.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the traditional common law rule limiting recovery for purely emotional distress and its physical consequences. It establishes a clear boundary: for such a claim to succeed, the defendant's conduct must be independently unlawful (e.g., a trespass or assault), not just malicious or rude. The decision highlights the judiciary's historical reluctance to litigate claims based on fright alone due to concerns about speculative damages and causation. This holding predates and provides context for the later development of the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), which would eventually create a path for recovery in similar, but more extreme, situations.
