Kramarsky v. Stahl Management
401 N.Y.S.2d 943, 1977 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2630, 92 Misc. 2d 1030 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A landlord may legally refuse to rent to a prospective tenant based on criteria not specifically proscribed by anti-discrimination statutes, such as the tenant's occupation or the landlord's subjective belief that the tenant will be 'troublesome,' as long as this is not a pretext for discrimination based on a protected class.
Facts:
- Judith Pierce, a Black divorced woman, applied to rent an apartment managed by Stahl Management.
- On her rental application, Pierce listed her occupation as general counsel for the New York City Commission on Human Rights and noted her prior employment with the Legal Services Corporation.
- Mr. Stahl, the operator of Stahl Management, reviewed the application.
- Stahl admitted that he rejected Pierce's application because her background as a lawyer indicated to him that 'she would be a source of trouble to me as a tenant.'
- Stahl stated he would have preferred a tenant who was 'likely to be less informed and more passive' about their legal rights.
- To counter the discrimination claim, Stahl Management provided evidence that 30% of its apartments were rented to Black tenants and 60% to unmarried persons.
Procedural Posture:
- Judith Pierce filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights against Stahl Management, alleging unlawful housing discrimination.
- While the administrative complaint was pending, the State Division of Human Rights filed an application in the New York Supreme Court, a trial-level court.
- The application, brought on by an order to show cause, sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit Stahl Management from renting the apartment to anyone other than Pierce pending the final determination of the complaint.
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Issue:
Does a landlord's refusal to rent an apartment to a prospective tenant because the tenant is a lawyer and perceived as likely to be a 'source of trouble' constitute unlawful discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law, which does not list occupation as a protected class?
Opinions:
Majority - Edward J. Greenfield, J.
No. A landlord’s refusal to rent to a prospective tenant based on their occupation as a lawyer does not constitute unlawful discrimination under the New York Human Rights Law. The court reasoned that while the statute prohibits discrimination based on enumerated protected classes such as race, sex, and marital status, it does not prevent a landlord from being selective based on other criteria. A landlord is free to exercise discretion and may reject tenants based on non-proscribed standards of acceptability, including occupation or the subjective fear that an intelligent, rights-aware tenant might cause future trouble. Since being a lawyer is not a protected class, discriminating against them is not illegal under the statute.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the protections of housing anti-discrimination laws are strictly limited to the classes enumerated in the statute. It affirms a landlord's broad discretion to reject tenants for subjective and even arbitrary reasons, such as their profession, as long as those reasons are not a pretext for discrimination based on a protected characteristic. The ruling establishes a precedent that landlords can legally screen out tenants they perceive as 'troublesome' or 'too aware of their rights,' creating a potential chilling effect on tenants who might otherwise advocate for themselves. This case highlights a significant gap in tenant protection, as it permits rental decisions based on factors that may correlate with, but are not explicitly, protected statuses.
