Kouromihelakis v. Hartford Fire Insurance
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136785, 30 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1349, 48 F. Supp. 3d 175 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
An employee states a plausible claim for associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) under a "distraction" theory when alleged facts support a reasonable inference that the employer's adverse action was based on a belief that the employee would miss future work to care for a disabled relative.
Facts:
- Michael Kouromihelakis was employed by Hartford Fire Insurance Company as a Regional Sales Consultant and his job performance was excellent.
- As a salaried, exempt employee, the company's written tardiness policy did not apply to Kouromihelakis.
- In November 2008, Kouromihelakis's father suffered a debilitating stroke, which qualified as a "serious health condition" and "disability" under federal law.
- Kouromihelakis informed his supervisor, Cole Phillips, about his father's condition and that he would periodically be late to work due to his caregiving duties.
- Despite his exempt status, Kouromihelakis received written warnings from his superiors for tardiness that was directly related to caring for his father.
- Kouromihelakis requested to change his hours under the company's "flex time" policy to accommodate his caregiving duties, but his requests were denied.
- On January 4, 2012, after having been approved for four hours of Personal Time Off to care for his father, Kouromihelakis arrived at work at 1:26 p.m. and was terminated for tardiness.
- Approximately eleven months after his termination, Hartford Fire Insurance Company amended Kouromihelakis's Form U5 with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), falsely claiming he had engaged in fraud.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Michael Kouromihelakis filed a six-count complaint against Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.
- Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Count Three (ADA associational discrimination) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss Counts One, Two, Four, Five, and Six for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
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Issue:
Does an employee state a plausible claim for "associational discrimination" under the ADA by alleging they were terminated due to periodic tardiness related to caring for a disabled family member, from which it can be inferred that the employer acted on a belief about the employee's future distractions or absences?
Opinions:
Majority - Thompson, J.
Yes. An employee states a plausible claim for associational discrimination under the ADA's "distraction" theory by alleging facts that support a reasonable inference that the termination was based on the employer's belief that the employee would miss future work to care for a disabled relative. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Larimer, which identifies "distraction" as a valid theory of associational discrimination. This occurs when an employer terminates an employee based on the belief that the employee will be inattentive or miss work due to their responsibilities for a disabled associate. The plaintiff's allegations—that his father was disabled, the defendant knew it, his tardiness was due to caregiving, his requests for flexibility were denied, and he was ultimately fired for that tardiness—are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the defendant terminated him based on a belief about future absences. The plaintiff is not required to explicitly plead the employer's belief about future absences, as it can be inferred from the alleged facts.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the pleading standards for an associational discrimination claim under the ADA within the Second Circuit's district courts by explicitly adopting the Seventh Circuit's "distraction" theory. It establishes that a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss without direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory motive, as such intent can be inferred from a pattern of conduct, like disciplining an employee for absences related to known caregiving duties. The ruling provides a pathway for employees who face adverse actions based on an employer's stereotypes or assumptions about their responsibilities for a disabled family member. This distinguishes such a claim from a failure to accommodate claim, as the ADA does not require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to non-disabled employees associated with a disabled person.
