Konzelman v. Konzelman
158 N.J. 185, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 542, 729 A.2d 7 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A provision in a property settlement agreement that terminates alimony upon the dependent spouse’s cohabitation is enforceable, provided the agreement was entered into voluntarily and is fair and equitable, and the cohabitation is a stable, marriage-like relationship.
Facts:
- Kathleen and Lawrence Konzelman divorced after a twenty-seven-year marriage.
- Their divorce decree incorporated a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) providing that Lawrence's $700 per week alimony obligation would terminate if Kathleen cohabited with an unrelated adult male for four continuous months.
- Both parties had legal counsel when they entered into the PSA.
- Lawrence hired private investigators to conduct surveillance on Kathleen's residence for 127 days.
- Investigators observed that Roger Liput stayed at Kathleen's home most evenings and left for work in the mornings, parked his car in her garage, did yard work, and used her phone number as a contact for his softball team.
- Kathleen and Liput were in a monogamous romantic relationship, vacationed together (with Liput paying most expenses), spent holidays with each other's families, and maintained a joint savings account.
- Based on the investigators' findings, Lawrence terminated his alimony payments to Kathleen.
Procedural Posture:
- Kathleen Konzelman filed a motion in the trial court to enforce the alimony provision of the PSA after Lawrence Konzelman ceased payments.
- Lawrence Konzelman filed a cross-motion seeking to terminate his support obligation based on the PSA's cohabitation clause.
- The trial court conducted a plenary hearing and found that cohabitation had occurred, but it invalidated the termination clause as against public policy.
- The trial court instead modified Lawrence’s alimony obligation, reducing it by $170 per week to account for the economic benefit Kathleen received from the cohabitation.
- Lawrence (appellant) appealed the trial court's refusal to enforce the termination clause to the Appellate Division, and Kathleen (appellee) cross-appealed the finding of cohabitation.
- The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that the cohabitation provision was enforceable.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Kathleen Konzelman's petition for certification.
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Issue:
Is a provision in a property settlement agreement, which terminates alimony payments upon the dependent spouse's cohabitation with another person, enforceable without a specific inquiry into the dependent spouse's economic circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Handler, J.
Yes. A provision in a property settlement agreement to terminate alimony upon cohabitation is enforceable if it was fairly and voluntarily agreed upon. The court reasoned that public policy strongly favors consensual agreements to resolve marital disputes, and parties should be free to define for themselves what constitutes a 'changed circumstance' sufficient to alter alimony. Just as the legislature has determined that remarriage automatically terminates alimony without an economic inquiry, parties can contractually agree that a marriage-like cohabitation will have the same effect. As long as the agreement is fair, was entered into knowingly with counsel, and the cohabitation is proven to be a stable, interdependent relationship, courts should enforce the provision without conducting a separate economic needs analysis.
Dissenting - O'Hern, J.
No. A provision terminating alimony upon cohabitation without regard to economic need is unenforceable because it violates public policy and departs from the established economic needs test. The dissent argued that alimony modification should be based solely on the dependent spouse's actual economic dependency, not their personal life or relationships. Enforcing such clauses allows an economically dominant ex-spouse to control the recipient's personal life, infringes on their right to privacy, and creates a double standard for post-divorce relationships. The dissent contended that this approach ignores the unequal bargaining power often present in divorces and will lead to intrusive and tasteless judicial inquiries into the private lives of divorced individuals.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in matrimonial law by prioritizing freedom of contract over the judiciary's traditional role of modifying alimony based solely on a change in economic circumstances. By allowing parties to define cohabitation as a trigger for alimony termination, the court empowers them to create their own post-divorce arrangements. However, this raises concerns about potential abuses stemming from unequal bargaining power during divorce negotiations and the potential for such clauses to be used to control the personal lives of dependent spouses. The case sets a precedent for enforcing these clauses but requires judicial oversight to ensure the initial agreement was fair and that the cohabitation is more than a casual relationship.
