Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange
94 Daily Journal DAR 5862, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A private party cannot maintain an action for public nuisance unless they suffer damage different in kind, not merely in degree, from that suffered by the general public; a private nuisance action cannot be maintained for an interference in the use and enjoyment of land caused solely by the fear of a future injury, but rather requires an actual interference with a specific property right.
Facts:
- Snafuel, Inc., a corporation formed by airlines, constructed the 'Fuel Farm' consisting of three 300,000-gallon above-ground jet fuel storage tanks at John Wayne Airport.
- The Fuel Farm is located in the northwest quadrant of the airport, 500 feet from the edge of the main runway.
- The above-ground construction and location of the tanks were contrary to studies done on behalf of the County of Orange, which recognized the potential disaster in the event of an aircraft accident.
- The Fuel Farm's location and operation violate various federal regulations and county ordinances, presenting a severe and unnecessary risk of damage from fire and release of toxic chemicals.
- Koll-Irvine Center, an industrial park, comprises commercial unit owners and common area owners, located on the northwest border of John Wayne Airport, approximately 100 feet from the Fuel Farm.
- The proximity of the Fuel Farm causes Koll-Irvine's property owners and employees to live in fear of destruction of their lives and property due to a potential aircraft accident or tank rupture.
- The perceived threat has caused Koll-Irvine's employees to change their use of the property, including avoiding a parking lot across from the Fuel Farm, keeping doors and windows overlooking the Fuel Farm closed, and relocating workspaces.
- Koll-Irvine alleges extreme mental anguish, fear of property insurance cancellation or prohibitive premium increases, and diminution in property value due to the risk posed by the Fuel Farm.
Procedural Posture:
- Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Association filed its original complaint against the County of Orange and Snafuel, Inc. in November 1991 in the trial court (presumably state superior court) seeking damages and injunctive relief for public and private nuisance, strict liability, and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
- In response to the county’s motion to strike and dismiss the original complaint, Koll-Irvine filed an amended complaint in January 1992.
- Demurrers to the amended complaint were sustained by the trial court.
- Koll-Irvine filed a second amended complaint, limiting its claims to public and private nuisance.
- At the hearing on the demurrers to the second amended complaint, the trial court found the allegations did not adequately plead any individual or private right different from the rest of the community and sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.
- Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Association (appellant) appealed from the judgment against them following the order sustaining the demurrers of the County of Orange and Snafuel, Inc. (appellees).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Does a private party, alleging fear of destruction, increased insurance premiums, diminished property value, and altered property use due to the proximity of jet fuel storage tanks, plead sufficient 'special injury' to maintain an action for public nuisance? 2. Can a private nuisance action be maintained based solely on the fear of future catastrophic harm from nearby jet fuel storage tanks, even if it leads to diminished property value and mental anguish?
Opinions:
Majority - WALLIN, J.
No, a private party cannot maintain an action for public nuisance based on allegations of fear, increased insurance premiums, diminished property value, or altered property use that are merely different in degree, not in kind, from the harm suffered by the general public. No, a private nuisance action cannot be maintained based solely on the fear of future catastrophic harm. The court affirmed the judgment, finding Koll-Irvine's allegations insufficient. For the public nuisance claim, the court reasoned that the alleged damages—mental anguish, risk of higher insurance premiums, diminished property values, and reduced usefulness of premises—apply to all members of the public within the potential blast zone, differing only in degree of exposure, not in kind of harm. Citing Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., the court held that fear common to the general community, even if more intense for those closer, does not constitute a 'special injury' distinct in kind. Since Koll-Irvine failed to allege damages different from the general community, it lacked standing for a public nuisance action. For the private nuisance claim, the court explained that a private nuisance is based on a disturbance of rights in land, requiring an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of one's land. However, California law does not permit a private nuisance action for an interference in the use and enjoyment of land caused solely by the fear of a future injury. The court referenced Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego (threat of future flooding) and Akins v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist. (fear of radioactive materials) to support this. While emotional distress and diminution in value can be damages in a private nuisance action, they must be caused by an actual interference with a specific property right (e.g., noise, smoke, vibration), not merely be the alleged property right itself (i.e., fear). The changes in property use alleged by Koll-Irvine were also rooted in fear rather than actual, present interference.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standing requirements for private parties seeking to abate a public nuisance and the scope of private nuisance claims in California. It reinforces that a private party must demonstrate harm 'different in kind' for public nuisance, not just greater proximity or intensity of a shared public risk. For private nuisance, it establishes a bright-line rule that mere fear of future harm, even if leading to tangible economic and emotional distress, is insufficient without an accompanying 'actual physical invasion or damage' or 'interference with a specific private property right.' This limits the ability of property owners to seek relief for perceived threats, particularly from facilities deemed dangerous but not yet causing direct physical impacts, and emphasizes the role of public entities in addressing broader community risks.
