Yes, this law is unconstitutional. The problem is that the phrase 'credible and reliable' is too vague. The law doesn't give any clear rules about what kind of ID is good enough. One police officer might accept a name and address, while another might demand more. This gives police total power to decide on the spot who to arrest, which can lead to unfairness and discrimination. Laws have to be clear so that everyone knows the rules and the police can't just make them up as they go.

No, this law is fine. A law should only be thrown out for being confusing if it's confusing in every single situation, which this one isn't. For example, if someone told a cop, 'It's none of your business who I am,' they would clearly be breaking this law. We shouldn't get rid of a whole law just because it might be tricky to apply in some weird cases. The court is overreacting and meddling with the state's ability to fight crime.

Yes, the law is unconstitutional, and there's another big reason why. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unfair police stops. While police can briefly stop and question you if they are suspicious, you have the right to remain silent. You don't have to answer their questions. This California law tries to punish people for staying quiet by making it a crime. That's not allowed; you can't be arrested just for refusing to talk to the police during a brief stop.

Yes, the California law is unconstitutional because it doesn't explain what 'good enough' ID is and doesn't give clear rules for police to follow. This means police get to decide whether someone's ID is good enough, which isn't fair. The law also interferes with people's freedom to move around. Even if police have a good reason to stop someone, the law doesn't say how they should decide if the person's ID is okay.

The majority is wrong to strike down the whole law as unconstitutional. Usually, a law should only be found too confusing if it's never clear when someone breaks it. This law is clear in at least some situations, like if someone refuses to give any ID at all. The majority's worries about police abusing power could be dealt with by looking at each case separately, not by getting rid of the entire law.

The law violates the Fourth Amendment, which is the part of the Constitution that protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Police usually need probable cause to detain someone, with only a few exceptions. Making it a crime not to give ID when police ask based on reasonable suspicion goes too far. During brief stops, police can ask questions but can't force answers or arrest people just for staying silent. This law wrongly tries to force what the Constitution doesn't allow.

T] he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement

Also, the law must be written in a way that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

An important aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the " `requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement

California statute requiring loiterers to provide "credible and reliable" identification and account for his presence was unconstitutionally vague

—the Court struck down a law that allowed police officers to arrest anyone who did not present "credible and reliable" identification.

In evaluating whether a statute is vague, a court must consider both whether it provides notice to the public and whether it adequately curtails arbitrary enforcement.

For example, "where the legislature fails to provide minimal guidance [for government law enforcement], a criminal statute may permit a `standardless sweep that allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections

A criminal law is unconstitutionally vague when the law is "so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement."

Yes. A penal statute requiring a suspect to provide "credible and reliable" identification is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. The void-for-vagueness doctrine under the Due Process Clause requires that a criminal statute define an offense with sufficient definiteness to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The California statute contains no standard for what a suspect must do to satisfy the "credible and reliable" identification requirement. This vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of police officers to determine compliance, allowing for a "standardless sweep" that could permit officers to pursue their personal predilections. While the state has a legitimate interest in combating crime, that interest cannot justify legislation that fails to meet constitutional standards for clarity and definiteness.

No. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face because it is not impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A facial challenge for vagueness should only succeed if a statute provides no clear notice of what is prohibited. In this case, there is a core of conduct that is clearly proscribed; for instance, a suspect who tells an officer, "Who I am is just none of your business," would plainly violate the statute. The majority improperly confounds the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth by invalidating the statute based on hypothetical applications rather than the clear conduct it prohibits. The state court's definition of "credible and reliable" provides sufficient guidance to prevent the law from being a 'standardless' statute like those struck down in prior cases.

Yes. The statute is unconstitutionally vague, and even if it were not, it would violate the Fourth Amendment. While Terry v. Ohio permits a brief detention for questioning based on reasonable suspicion, it does not compel an individual to answer. A person stopped during a Terry stop is free to decline to answer questions, and their refusal cannot furnish the basis for an arrest. By criminalizing the failure to provide identification, California's statute unconstitutionally compels an answer and authorizes an arrest on less than probable cause, exceeding the strictly circumscribed limits of a Terry stop and violating the Fourth Amendment.

Yes, the California statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause because it fails to clarify what constitutes 'credible and reliable' identification and does not provide minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. The statute vests complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest. This results in a violation of the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. The statute also implicates the constitutional right to freedom of movement. Although the initial detention may be justified, the statute fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the identification requirement.

The majority errs in holding the statute facially unconstitutional. The usual rule is that the alleged vagueness of a criminal statute must be judged in light of the conduct that is charged to be violative of the statute. If the defendant's conduct is clearly prohibited, he cannot challenge the statute on grounds of vagueness. The statute is not vague in all its applications, as there are situations where it is clear the suspect has not complied, such as providing no information at all. The majority's concerns about arbitrary enforcement could be addressed through case-by-case adjudication rather than striking down the statute on its face.

The statute violates the Fourth Amendment, regardless of any vagueness concerns. The Fourth Amendment prohibits seizures of an individual unless there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, with only narrow exceptions. The requirement to identify oneself during a Terry stop exceeds the scope of what is permissible in a seizure based only on reasonable suspicion. During such stops, individuals may be briefly detained and asked questions, but they cannot be compelled to answer or be arrested for refusing to do so. The statute improperly attempts to compel what cannot be compelled under the Constitution by authorizing arrest and prosecution for failing to identify oneself.

Kolender v. Lawson

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