Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center
420 A.2d 915, 1980 Me. LEXIS 674 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion requires proof that the defendant (1) intentionally intruded upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion, and (2) that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The mere unnecessary presence of a third party is not, by itself, sufficient to establish liability as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Kathleen Knight was admitted to Penobscot Bay Medical Center to give birth under the care of Dr. Albert J. Lantinen, Jr.
- A registered nurse, Sandra Robie, was required to work past her shift due to a severe snowstorm.
- Nurse Robie's husband, Theodore Robie, who had arrived to drive her home, decided to wait for her at the hospital.
- To give him something to do, Nurse Robie obtained permission from Dr. Lantinen for her husband to witness a birth.
- Dr. Lantinen initially directed Mr. Robie to observe another patient's delivery but, due to developing complications with that patient, redirected him to observe Kathleen Knight's delivery instead.
- Theodore Robie, wearing hospital attire, stood behind a viewing window in a surgical corridor approximately twelve feet from the delivery table.
- From his position, Mr. Robie had a side view of Mrs. Knight, whose body was draped; he did not see the actual delivery but saw the baby being lifted up and placed on her abdomen.
- Mrs. Knight's husband, William Knight, was later brought into the delivery room, where both he and his wife could see Mr. Robie observing through the window without knowing who he was or having consented to his presence.
Procedural Posture:
- William and Kathleen Knight sued Penobscot Bay Medical Center, Sandra Robie, Theodore Robie, and Albert J. Lantinen, Jr. in the Superior Court of Waldo County, Maine (a court of first instance).
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the claims of invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct.
- The Knights (appellants) appealed the part of the judgment denying their invasion of privacy claim to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
- On appeal, the Knights argued that the presiding justice at trial gave the jury erroneous instructions regarding the elements of invasion of privacy.
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Issue:
Does the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion require proof that the defendant intended to intrude and that the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person, rather than being established as a matter of law by the mere "unnecessary" presence of an observer?
Opinions:
Majority - Wernick, J.
Yes. The tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion requires a plaintiff to prove both that the defendant intentionally intruded upon their solitude and that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the judge properly instructed the jury based on the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. The plaintiffs' requested instruction was erroneous because it improperly suggested that the 'unnecessary' presence of an observer was sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute an invasion of privacy. This requested instruction failed to include the essential element of intent and ignored the requirement that the intrusion be 'highly offensive to a reasonable person,' which is a question of fact for the jury to determine based on all the circumstances of the case.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Maine's adoption of the Restatement's modern, two-part formulation for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, emphasizing its subjective elements: intent and the 'highly offensive' nature of the conduct. It explicitly rejects older, stricter standards where the mere presence of an uninvited third party in a private setting could be a per se violation. The ruling clarifies that liability is not automatic and depends heavily on a factual determination by the jury, which must weigh all circumstances—such as the observer's location, what was visible, and the defendant's intent—against the standard of a reasonable person.
