Knight v. Jewett
834 P.2d 696, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
In sports, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk holds that a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from risks inherent in the sport. A coparticipant can only be held liable for injuries if they intentionally injure another player or engage in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
Facts:
- On January 25, 1987, Kendra Knight and Michael Jewett attended a Super Bowl party with mutual friends.
- During halftime, several guests, including Knight and Jewett, began an informal game of co-ed touch football on a dirt lot.
- No rules were explicitly discussed before the game began.
- Partway into the game, Jewett ran into Knight, and she told him not to play so rough or she would have to stop playing.
- On the very next play, Jewett attempted to intercept a pass and in doing so, collided with Knight, knocking her down.
- As Jewett came down, he stepped on Knight's right hand, causing a severe injury to her little finger.
- Knight's finger was later amputated after three unsuccessful surgeries.
Procedural Posture:
- Kendra Knight sued Michael Jewett in the superior court (trial court) for negligence and assault and battery.
- Jewett filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Knight's claim was barred by the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of risk.
- The trial court granted Jewett's motion for summary judgment.
- Knight, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jewett, the appellee.
- The California Supreme Court granted Knight's petition for review to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal.
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Issue:
Under California's comparative fault system, does the doctrine of assumption of risk completely bar a plaintiff's recovery for injuries caused by a coparticipant's merely careless or negligent conduct during an active sport?
Opinions:
Majority - George, J.
Yes, the doctrine of assumption of risk completely bars recovery in this situation. The court adopts a framework distinguishing between 'primary' and 'secondary' assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk applies where, due to the nature of the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular harm. In the context of active sports, careless conduct by coparticipants is an inherent risk of the sport, meaning they owe no duty to protect each other from ordinary negligence. Liability may only be imposed for intentional torts or for reckless conduct totally outside the range of the sport's ordinary activities. Since Jewett's actions were, at most, negligent and not reckless, his conduct did not breach any legal duty owed to Knight, thus her claim is completely barred.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Yes, the defendant is not liable. While I agree with the result and the lead opinion's duty-based analysis for sports participants, the entire vocabulary of assumption of risk should be eliminated. The doctrine is confusing and anachronistic. The analysis should focus simply on whether the defendant owed a duty of care in the first place; if no duty was owed, there is no liability. If a duty was breached, the case should proceed under standard comparative fault principles without the confusing overlay of 'primary' or 'secondary' assumption of risk.
Concurring - Panelli, J.
Yes, the plaintiff's claim is barred. While I agree with the judgment, I disagree with the majority's duty-based analysis and instead adopt the consent-based reasoning of Justice Kennard's dissent. The key question is whether the plaintiff voluntarily accepted a known risk. The undisputed facts show that Knight, an avid football fan, knew that physical contact and the risk of injury are inherent in any form of football. By choosing to play, she assumed the risk of being knocked down, and her claim is therefore completely barred.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
No, the doctrine should not completely bar recovery here because there are triable issues of fact. The majority errs by replacing the traditional, consent-based analysis of assumption of risk with a new 'no-duty' rule. Under the traditional framework, the defense should only apply if the plaintiff subjectively knew, appreciated, and voluntarily consented to the specific risk. Here, the game was informal and 'mock,' and Knight explicitly told Jewett his play was too rough immediately before the injury. This creates a factual dispute as to whether she consented to the specific risk of his aggressive conduct, making summary judgment improper.
Analysis:
This landmark case fundamentally reshaped California's assumption of risk doctrine in the wake of comparative fault. By replacing the confusing 'reasonable vs. unreasonable' implied assumption of risk analysis with the 'primary vs. secondary' framework, the court clarified when the doctrine acts as a complete bar versus when it merges into comparative fault. The decision's 'no-duty' rule for sports coparticipants (primary assumption of risk) provides significant protection against liability for ordinary negligence in athletic contexts, encouraging vigorous participation. This duty-based analysis has become the dominant framework for assumption of risk cases in California, extending beyond sports to other recreational activities.
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