Kneipp v. Tedder
95 F.3d 1199, 1996 WL 526929 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A state actor can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating an individual's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights if the actor's affirmative conduct creates a danger or renders an individual more vulnerable to a foreseeable harm that they would not have otherwise faced.
Facts:
- On a January night, Samantha Kneipp and her husband Joseph Kneipp were walking home from a tavern.
- Samantha Kneipp was visibly and severely intoxicated, staggering and unable to walk without assistance from her husband.
- Philadelphia Police Officer Wesley Tedder stopped the couple for causing a disturbance when they were about one-third of a block from their apartment.
- Officer Tedder and other officers at the scene gave Joseph Kneipp permission to go home, leading him to believe the police would take care of his wife.
- After Joseph Kneipp left, Officer Tedder sent Samantha Kneipp to walk the rest of the way home alone.
- Samantha Kneipp never reached her apartment and was later found unconscious at the bottom of an embankment.
- As a result of exposure to the cold, Samantha Kneipp suffered hypothermia, which caused permanent brain damage.
Procedural Posture:
- Samantha Kneipp’s legal guardians filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Philadelphia and several police officers in U.S. District Court.
- The defendants (City of Philadelphia and police officers) filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a constitutional violation.
- The plaintiffs (Kneipp's legal guardians) appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's affirmative act of separating a visibly intoxicated person from their sober caretaker and then sending the intoxicated person home alone in cold weather, thereby increasing their risk of harm, constitute a violation of that person's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under the state-created danger theory?
Opinions:
Majority - Mansmann, Circuit Judge
Yes, a police officer's affirmative act of separating an intoxicated person from their private caretaker and sending them home alone, thereby increasing their risk of harm, can constitute a violation of that person's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under the state-created danger theory. The court formally adopted the state-created danger theory as a viable basis for a § 1983 claim, distinguishing it from the "special relationship" test established in DeShaney v. Winnebago. The court reasoned that liability under this theory is predicated on the state's affirmative acts that create a danger or make a person more vulnerable to it. Here, the police officers' actions—separating Samantha from Joseph and then abandoning her—were affirmative acts that put her in a worse position than she would have been in without their intervention. A reasonable jury could find that the officers used their authority to create a danger and acted with willful disregard for Samantha's safety, satisfying the elements of the state-created danger test.
Analysis:
This case is significant because the Third Circuit formally adopts the "state-created danger" theory as a viable basis for a § 1983 claim. This decision carves out an important exception to the general rule from DeShaney that the state has no affirmative duty to protect individuals from private harm. By establishing this theory, the court broadens the scope of potential liability for state actors, particularly police officers, whose affirmative actions increase the risk of harm to a specific individual, even when no formal custodial relationship exists. The case provides a clear, four-part test for applying the theory, offering a pathway for future plaintiffs who are harmed after a state actor intervenes and makes their situation more perilous.
