Klump v. Nazareth Area School District
425 F.Supp.2d 622, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15328, 2006 WL 859848 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a school official's search of a student's property must be reasonable, meaning it must be both justified at its inception by a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference.
Facts:
- Christopher Klump was a student at Nazareth Area High School, which had a policy permitting students to carry cell phones but prohibiting their use or display during school hours.
- On March 17, 2004, Klump's cell phone fell out of his pocket and became visible on his leg.
- Teacher Shawn Kimberly Kocher saw the phone and confiscated it for violating the school's display policy.
- After the confiscation, Kocher and Assistant Principal Margaret Grube used the phone to call nine other students listed in Klump's contact directory.
- Kocher and Grube also accessed Klump's stored text messages and voice mail.
- The two officials then used the phone's AOL Instant Messenger feature to have a conversation with Klump's younger brother, impersonating Klump.
- Grube later claimed that a text message on the phone from Klump's girlfriend containing the word 'tampon', which Grube interpreted as slang for a large marijuana cigarette, prompted the search to investigate possible drug use.
Procedural Posture:
- Toby Klump, Leigh Klump, and Christopher Klump filed a Complaint against the Nazareth Area School District and several school officials in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas (a state trial court).
- The defendants removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (a federal trial court).
- The plaintiffs subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging ten causes of action.
- The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Issue:
Does a school official's search of the contents of a student's confiscated cell phone violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches if the search is not justified at its inception by reasonable grounds to suspect the search will reveal evidence of a violation of law or school rules?
Opinions:
Majority - Gardner, District Judge.
Yes, a school official's search of the contents of a student's confiscated cell phone violates the Fourth Amendment if it is not justified at its inception. While students have a reduced expectation of privacy at school, the reasonableness standard established in New Jersey v. T.L.O. still requires a two-part inquiry: the search must be justified at its inception and reasonable in scope. Here, the confiscation of the phone was justified by the violation of the school's display policy. However, the subsequent search of the phone's contents—calling other students, reading texts, and accessing voicemail—was a separate intrusion that required its own justification. Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, the officials had no reasonable suspicion that a search would reveal evidence of another violation at the moment they began searching. The officials' claim that a suspicious text message prompted the search is disputed by the plaintiff, who alleges the message was only discovered after the unjustified search had already begun. Therefore, the search was not justified at its inception, and the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of litigation.
Analysis:
This case is significant for applying the T.L.O. reasonableness standard to the search of a student's personal cell phone. It clarifies that the justification for confiscating a device (for a minor rule infraction) does not automatically extend to a full-blown search of its digital contents. The court's analysis separates the act of seizure from the subsequent act of searching, requiring each to be independently justified. This decision sets a precedent that school officials need a distinct and particularized reasonable suspicion of a more serious offense before they can intrude upon the significant privacy interests inherent in a student's personal electronic device.
