Kline v. Harrisburg
1949 Pa. LEXIS 431, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality's power to enact zoning regulations is derived solely from the state's enabling statute, and any zoning ordinance, including a temporary or 'interim' one, is invalid if the municipality fails to strictly follow the mandatory procedural requirements set forth in that statute.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs owned a four-acre tract of land in the City of Harrisburg and entered into an agreement to form a corporation to build five apartment buildings on the property.
- The plaintiffs prepared all necessary plans and specifications for the project, with an estimated construction cost of $948,000.
- On February 25, 1949, the plaintiffs applied to the Federal Housing Administration for mortgage insurance for the project, and a commitment was made available two months later.
- On April 25, 1949, the plaintiffs applied to the Building Inspector of the City of Harrisburg for a building permit, tendering the required fee; their application conformed in all respects to the existing Building Code.
- The City Planning Commission had been studying a comprehensive zoning plan since 1945, but the work had not matured to the point where public hearings could be held.
- On May 10, 1949, the Harrisburg City Council passed Ordinance No. 153, an 'interim' ordinance that prohibited the construction of any building other than a single-family detached dwelling in certain residential districts, including the one where plaintiffs' land was located.
- The building permit was refused by the city solely because of the newly passed Ordinance No. 153.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs sued the City of Harrisburg and its officials in the court of first instance.
- The suit sought to restrain the city from enforcing Ordinance No. 153 and to compel the issuance of a building permit.
- The trial court heard the case based on the bill, answer, and a joint stipulation of facts.
- The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the ordinance void and ordering the city to issue the permit.
- The defendants, the City of Harrisburg, appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does an interim zoning ordinance, enacted by a municipality without following the mandatory procedural requirements of the state's zoning enabling statute, constitute a valid exercise of the municipality's power?
Opinions:
Majority - Woodside, J.
No. An interim zoning ordinance enacted without following the mandatory procedural requirements of the state's zoning enabling statute is not a valid exercise of municipal power. Municipalities are not sovereigns and their powers, particularly in zoning, are strictly limited to those expressly granted by the legislature. The Third Class City Law grants cities the power to zone but explicitly mandates a specific procedure, including recommendations from a planning commission, tentative and final reports, public notice, and public hearings. The statute expressly states that council 'shall not... impose any regulations or restrictions, until after the final report and after said hearing.' The City of Harrisburg admittedly failed to comply with any of these procedural requirements. A municipality cannot circumvent these specific, mandatory provisions by claiming an inherent or implied power to pass an 'interim' ordinance to preserve the status quo, nor can it rely on its general police power. Because the ordinance's effect is to regulate land use and deprive an owner of substantial rights, the power to do so must be exercised strictly in the manner designated by the legislature.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line rule that procedural requirements in zoning enabling acts are mandatory conditions precedent to the valid exercise of zoning power. It reinforces the principle of Dillon's Rule, which narrowly construes municipal authority, by rejecting the city's argument for an 'implied' power to enact stopgap zoning measures. The ruling prioritizes statutory compliance and procedural due process over a municipality's substantive planning goals, potentially creating a 'race to the permit office' where developers can vest their rights before a properly enacted ordinance is passed. The decision places the onus on the state legislature, not the courts, to create specific statutory mechanisms for interim zoning controls if they are deemed necessary.
