Kitsis v. State Bar
153 Cal. Rptr. 836, 23 Cal.3d 857, 592 P.2d 323 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment does not protect an attorney's in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain, and such conduct, particularly when pervasive and combined with deceptive practices, constitutes moral turpitude warranting disbarment.
Facts:
- David Kitsis was admitted to practice law in 1963.
- From mid-1971 to mid-1974, Kitsis employed three laypersons to solicit clients for him and offered to pay three others for referrals of personal injury claimants.
- April Turner, one of Kitsis's employees, regularly used a police radio to go to accident scenes and recommended Kitsis’s services to accident victims, resulting in approximately 150 clients.
- Turner informed an auto body repair shop owner and manager that Kitsis would pay $50 for each client referral, an offer Kitsis personally repeated, and he subsequently paid $50 to the manager for a referral.
- Turner, sometimes accompanied by interpreter Esther Gonzalez, also approached patients in hospital rooms to offer Kitsis’s services.
- When Turner asked Kitsis if her solicitations at the hospital and accident scenes were illegal, Kitsis responded that they were 'merely unethical—not illegal.'
- Kitsis employed Larry Young, a former medical center employee, to contact hospitals, auto body repair shops, and an insurance company to obtain names of accident victims for solicitation.
- Kitsis and Young approached Charles McClinton, a security guard at Martin Luther King Hospital, and offered to pay him for referrals of auto accident victims, which McClinton reported to authorities.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1972, Petitioner David Kitsis was privately reproved for violating former rule 3a (payment of medical or other personal expenses incurred by a client).
- An investigation by the Los Angeles District Attorney led to a misdemeanor charge against Kitsis for solicitation contrary to Business and Professions Code section 6152 (unlawful to solicit attorney business in hospitals).
- Kitsis pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge, and the judgment of conviction became final, with the United States Supreme Court denying certiorari on June 5, 1978.
- In 1974, three local administrative committees of the State Bar commenced proceedings by issuing notices to show cause, alleging seven counts of employment solicitation.
- On March 3, 1976, a local administrative committee found Kitsis culpable on six counts of solicitation and recommended a five-year suspension, stayed on condition of one year actual suspension.
- The Examiner for the State Bar supported the committee’s findings but recommended a longer actual suspension of two and a half years.
- On July 29, 1976, Kitsis filed a statement opposing the report, seeking a new hearing or augmentation of the record with an affidavit that contradicted his earlier stipulated admissions, leading the examiner to recommend disbarment based on a finding of a false declaration.
- Kitsis subsequently attempted to withdraw his July 29 filings.
- On October 8, 1976, the Disciplinary Board, after oral argument by Kitsis, adopted the committee’s findings and added a finding that Kitsis had willfully filed a false declaration, unanimously recommending disbarment.
- On February 23, 1977, the Supreme Court of California issued a writ of review, but on June 9, 1977, granted the Disciplinary Board's request for remand.
- On remand, the Disciplinary Board set aside its independent finding regarding the false declaration (due to lack of notice/opportunity to be heard).
- On July 22, 1977, the Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment based on the committee findings it had adopted, which is the recommendation now before the California Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment protect an attorney's in-person solicitation of clients, and does a continuous and deceptive course of such solicitation constitute moral turpitude justifying disbarment by the State Bar?
Opinions:
Majority - THE COURT
No, the First Amendment does not protect an attorney's in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain, and a continuous and deceptive course of such solicitation constitutes moral turpitude justifying disbarment. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. (1978), which held that a state bar may constitutionally discipline a lawyer for in-person solicitation. The Ohralik Court recognized that in-person solicitation can exert pressure, demand immediate responses, lead to uninformed decisions, and discourage critical comparisons of legal services. States have a compelling interest in regulating such commercial activity to reduce overreaching, undue influence, protect privacy, and prevent conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's pecuniary self-interest. Kitsis acknowledged his 'willful acts of solicitation,' which included approaching victims at accident sites and in hospital rooms—precisely the type of conduct Ohralik permits states to curtail. Furthermore, Kitsis pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of solicitation under Business and Professions Code section 6152, which alone is sufficient grounds for discipline. His conduct also involved moral turpitude, defined as acts 'contrary to honesty and good morals,' particularly by deliberately violating his duties as an attorney (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068) and by deceiving his employee, April Turner, into believing her solicitation activities were not illegal. Given Kitsis's 'long and continuous course of unlawful solicitation' involving over 200 persons, directed at vulnerable victims, and coupled with deception, the court found disbarment, rather than the usual suspension for solicitation, to be appropriate. The court noted that 'the public and the profession which suffer the greater damage from solicitation practices' and that explicit proof of harm to clients is immaterial in light of the state's interest in preventing harm.
Analysis:
This case significantly reaffirms the constitutional permissibility of state bar regulations prohibiting in-person attorney solicitation, especially after Ohralik. It establishes that even without direct proof of client harm, the sheer magnitude, persistence, and deceptive nature of solicitation activities are sufficient grounds for severe disciplinary action, including disbarment. The decision underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding the integrity of the legal profession and protecting the public from predatory practices, asserting that an attorney's duty to support the law and act with honesty outweighs claims of free speech in commercial solicitation contexts.
